Added ssl patch. helps closes #51368.

7 files changed, 5544 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/net-www/apache/ChangeLog b/net-www/apache/ChangeLog
index baa6cde89170..1983f6da4a85 100644
--- a/net-www/apache/ChangeLog
+++ b/net-www/apache/ChangeLog
@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@
 # ChangeLog for net-www/apache
 # Copyright 2002-2004 Gentoo Technologies, Inc.; Distributed under the GPL v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/ChangeLog,v 1.176 2004/05/29 16:28:37 zul Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/ChangeLog,v 1.177 2004/05/29 16:39:44 zul Exp $
+
+  29 May 2004; Chuck Short <zul@gentoo.org> apache-2.0.49-r1.ebuild,
+  apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild, apache-2.0.49.ebuild,
+  files/httpd-2.0.49-ssl_engine_kernel.patch,
+  files/patches/2.0.49-r1/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch,
+  files/patches/2.0.49-r2/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch:
+  Added ssl patch. Helps close #51368.
 
 *apache-1.3.31-r1 (29 May 2004)
 
-  29 May 2004; <chuck@gentoo.org> apache-1.3.31-r1.ebuild:
+  29 May 2004; Chuck Short <zul@gentoo.org> apache-1.3.31-r1.ebuild:
   Version bump, to use the new mod_ssl whitch takes cares of some security
   holes. See #51638.
 
@@ -21,10 +28,10 @@
   25 May 2004; Guy Martin <gmsoft@gentoo.org> apache-1.3.31.ebuild:
   Marked stable on hppa.
 
-  25 May 2004; <chuck@gentoo.org> apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild:
+  25 May 2004; Chuck Short <zul@gentoo.org> apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild:
   Fix repoman error.
 
-  25 May 2004; <chuck@gentoo.org> apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild:
+  25 May 2004; Chuck Short <zul@gentoo.org> apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild:
   Added static support for adding mod_ldap.
 
   24 May 2004; Bryan Østergaard <kloeri@gentoo.org> apache-1.3.31.ebuild:
@@ -33,7 +40,7 @@
   23 May 2004; Christian Birchinger <joker@gentoo.org> apache-1.3.31.ebuild:
   Added sparc stable keyword
 
-  25 May 2004; <chuck@gentoo.org> apache-1.3.29-r1.ebuild,
+  25 May 2004; Chuck Short <zul@gentoo.org> apache-1.3.29-r1.ebuild,
   apache-1.3.29-r2.ebuild:
   Updated depends.
 
diff --git a/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r1.ebuild b/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r1.ebuild
index aed7844acd89..9fa6bdc7ee8e 100644
--- a/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r1.ebuild
+++ b/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r1.ebuild
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Copyright 1999-2004 Gentoo Technologies, Inc.
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r1.ebuild,v 1.25 2004/05/26 12:24:16 stuart Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r1.ebuild,v 1.26 2004/05/29 16:39:44 zul Exp $
 
 inherit flag-o-matic eutils fixheadtails gnuconfig
 
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ src_unpack() {
 	cd ${S} || die
 	epatch ${FILESDIR}/apache-2.0.49-gentoo.diff || die
 	epatch ${FILESDIR}/httpd-2.0.49-cgi.patch || die
+	epatch ${FILESDIR}/httpd-2.0.49-ssl_engine_kernel.patch || die
 
 	epatch ${FILESDIR}/patches/${PVR}/04_ssl_makefile.patch || die
 
diff --git a/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild b/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild
index 2a6a2767d9b6..eeb4939ef54c 100644
--- a/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild
+++ b/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Copyright 1999-2004 Gentoo Technologies, Inc.
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild,v 1.9 2004/05/26 12:24:16 stuart Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49-r2.ebuild,v 1.10 2004/05/29 16:39:44 zul Exp $
 
 inherit flag-o-matic eutils fixheadtails gnuconfig
 
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ src_unpack() {
 	epatch ${FILESDIR}/patches/${PVR}/03_redhat_xfsz.patch || die
 	epatch ${FILESDIR}/patches/${PVR}/01_gentoo_cgi.patch || die
 	epatch ${FILESDIR}/patches/${PVR}/04_ssl_makefile.patch || die
+	epatch ${FILESDIR}/patches/${PVR}/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch || die
 
 	if use ipv6; then
 		epatch ${FILESDIR}/patches/${PVR}/01_gentoo_ipv6.patch || die
diff --git a/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49.ebuild b/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49.ebuild
index 337be45fa46c..75efde902a6d 100644
--- a/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49.ebuild
+++ b/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49.ebuild
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Copyright 1999-2004 Gentoo Technologies, Inc.
 # Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49.ebuild,v 1.13 2004/05/16 14:10:48 zul Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/net-www/apache/apache-2.0.49.ebuild,v 1.14 2004/05/29 16:39:44 zul Exp $
 
 inherit flag-o-matic eutils
 
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ src_unpack() {
 	unpack ${A} || die
 	cd ${S} || die
 	patch -p1 <${FILESDIR}/apache-2.0.49-gentoo.diff || die
+	epatch ${FILESDIR}/httpd-2.0.49-ssl_engine_kernel.patch || die
 	epatch ${FIESDIR}/httpd-2.0.49-cgi.patch || die
 
 	# integrated upstream
diff --git a/net-www/apache/files/httpd-2.0.49-ssl_engine_kernel.patch b/net-www/apache/files/httpd-2.0.49-ssl_engine_kernel.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4caf45f2041f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-www/apache/files/httpd-2.0.49-ssl_engine_kernel.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1842 @@
+diff -Naur httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
+--- httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c	2004-02-09 20:53:20.000000000 +0000
++++ httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c	2004-05-29 09:39:18.605535640 +0000
+@@ -793,7 +793,6 @@
+     SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
+     SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
+     SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
+-    char buf1[MAX_STRING_LEN], buf2[MAX_STRING_LEN];
+     char *clientdn;
+     const char *auth_line, *username, *password;
+ 
+@@ -872,14 +871,16 @@
+      * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file.
+      * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-)
+      */
+-    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%s:password", clientdn);
+-    ssl_util_uuencode(buf2, buf1, FALSE);
+-
+-    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "Basic %s", buf2);
+-    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", buf1);
++    auth_line = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "Basic ", 
++                            ap_pbase64encode(r->pool, 
++                                             apr_pstrcat(r->pool, clientdn, 
++                                                         ":password", NULL)),
++                            NULL);
++    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", auth_line);
+ 
+     ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
+-                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", buf1);
++                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"",
++                 auth_line);
+ 
+     return DECLINED;
+ }
+diff -Naur httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig
+--- httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig	2004-02-09 20:53:20.000000000 +0000
+@@ -0,0 +1,1804 @@
++/* Copyright 2001-2004 The Apache Software Foundation
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
++ *
++ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
++ *
++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
++ * limitations under the License.
++ */
++
++/*                      _             _
++ *  _ __ ___   ___   __| |    ___ ___| |  mod_ssl
++ * | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` |   / __/ __| |  Apache Interface to OpenSSL
++ * | | | | | | (_) | (_| |   \__ \__ \ |
++ * |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_|
++ *                      |_____|
++ *  ssl_engine_kernel.c
++ *  The SSL engine kernel
++ */
++                             /* ``It took me fifteen years to discover
++                                  I had no talent for programming, but
++                                  I couldn't give it up because by that
++                                  time I was too famous.''
++                                            -- Unknown                */
++#include "mod_ssl.h"
++
++/*
++ *  Post Read Request Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSL *ssl;
++
++    if (!sslconn) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    if (sslconn->non_ssl_request) {
++        const char *errmsg;
++        char *thisurl;
++        char *thisport = "";
++        int port = ap_get_server_port(r);
++
++        if (!ap_is_default_port(port, r)) {
++            thisport = apr_psprintf(r->pool, ":%u", port);
++        }
++
++        thisurl = ap_escape_html(r->pool,
++                                 apr_psprintf(r->pool, "https://%s%s/",
++                                              ap_get_server_name(r),
++                                              thisport));
++
++        errmsg = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
++                              "Reason: You're speaking plain HTTP "
++                              "to an SSL-enabled server port.<br />\n"
++                              "Instead use the HTTPS scheme to access "
++                              "this URL, please.<br />\n"
++                              "<blockquote>Hint: "
++                              "<a href=\"%s\"><b>%s</b></a></blockquote>",
++                              thisurl, thisurl);
++
++        apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", errmsg);
++
++        /* Now that we have caught this error, forget it. we are done
++         * with using SSL on this request.
++         */
++        sslconn->non_ssl_request = 0;
++        
++
++        return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Get the SSL connection structure and perform the
++     * delayed interlinking from SSL back to request_rec
++     */
++    if ((ssl = sslconn->ssl)) {
++        SSL_set_app_data2(ssl, r);
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Move SetEnvIf information from request_rec to conn_rec/BUFF
++ * to allow the close connection handler to use them.
++ */
++
++static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn)
++{
++    int i;
++    const apr_array_header_t *arr = apr_table_elts(r->subprocess_env);
++    const apr_table_entry_t *elts = (const apr_table_entry_t *)arr->elts;
++
++    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_STANDARD;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < arr->nelts; i++) {
++        const char *key = elts[i].key;
++
++        switch (*key) {
++          case 's':
++            /* being case-sensitive here.
++             * and not checking for the -shutdown since these are the only
++             * SetEnvIf "flags" we support
++             */
++            if (!strncmp(key+1, "sl-", 3)) {
++                key += 4;
++                if (!strncmp(key, "unclean", 7)) {
++                    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNCLEAN;
++                }
++                else if (!strncmp(key, "accurate", 8)) {
++                    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_ACCURATE;
++                }
++                return; /* should only ever be one ssl-*-shutdown */
++            }
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++}
++
++/*
++ *  URL Translation Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_Translate(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++
++    if (!(sslconn && sslconn->ssl)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Log information about incoming HTTPS requests
++     */
++    if (r->server->loglevel >= APLOG_INFO && ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                     "%s HTTPS request received for child %ld (server %s)",
++                     (r->connection->keepalives <= 0 ?
++                     "Initial (No.1)" :
++                     apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Subsequent (No.%d)",
++                                  r->connection->keepalives+1)),
++                     r->connection->id,
++                     ssl_util_vhostid(r->pool, r->server));
++    }
++
++    /* SetEnvIf ssl-*-shutdown flags can only be per-server,
++     * so they won't change across keepalive requests
++     */
++    if (sslconn->shutdown_type == SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNSET) {
++        ssl_configure_env(r, sslconn);
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  Access Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSL *ssl            = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL;
++    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    apr_array_header_t *requires;
++    ssl_require_t *ssl_requires;
++    char *cp;
++    int ok, i;
++    BOOL renegotiate = FALSE, renegotiate_quick = FALSE;
++    X509 *cert;
++    X509 *peercert;
++    X509_STORE *cert_store = NULL;
++    X509_STORE_CTX cert_store_ctx;
++    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_old = NULL, *cipher_list = NULL;
++    SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
++    int depth, verify_old, verify, n;
++
++    if (ssl) {
++        ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Support for SSLRequireSSL directive
++     */
++    if (dc->bSSLRequired && !ssl) {
++        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                      "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                      r->filename, "SSL connection required");
++
++        /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++        apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check to see if SSL protocol is on
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled || ssl)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++    /*
++     * Support for per-directory reconfigured SSL connection parameters.
++     *
++     * This is implemented by forcing an SSL renegotiation with the
++     * reconfigured parameter suite. But Apache's internal API processing
++     * makes our life very hard here, because when internal sub-requests occur
++     * we nevertheless should avoid multiple unnecessary SSL handshakes (they
++     * require extra network I/O and especially time to perform). 
++     * 
++     * But the optimization for filtering out the unnecessary handshakes isn't
++     * obvious and trivial.  Especially because while Apache is in its
++     * sub-request processing the client could force additional handshakes,
++     * too. And these take place perhaps without our notice. So the only
++     * possibility is to explicitly _ask_ OpenSSL whether the renegotiation
++     * has to be performed or not. It has to performed when some parameters
++     * which were previously known (by us) are not those we've now
++     * reconfigured (as known by OpenSSL) or (in optimized way) at least when
++     * the reconfigured parameter suite is stronger (more restrictions) than
++     * the currently active one.
++     */
++
++    /*
++     * Override of SSLCipherSuite
++     *
++     * We provide two options here:
++     *
++     * o The paranoid and default approach where we force a renegotiation when
++     *   the cipher suite changed in _any_ way (which is straight-forward but
++     *   often forces renegotiations too often and is perhaps not what the
++     *   user actually wanted).
++     *
++     * o The optimized and still secure way where we force a renegotiation
++     *   only if the currently active cipher is no longer contained in the
++     *   reconfigured/new cipher suite. Any other changes are not important
++     *   because it's the servers choice to select a cipher from the ones the
++     *   client supports. So as long as the current cipher is still in the new
++     *   cipher suite we're happy. Because we can assume we would have
++     *   selected it again even when other (better) ciphers exists now in the
++     *   new cipher suite. This approach is fine because the user explicitly
++     *   has to enable this via ``SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate''. So we do no
++     *   implicit optimizations.
++     */
++    if (dc->szCipherSuite) {
++        /* remember old state */
++
++        if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) {
++            cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
++        }
++        else {
++            cipher_list_old = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
++
++            if (cipher_list_old) {
++                cipher_list_old = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list_old);
++            }
++        }
++
++        /* configure new state */
++        if (!modssl_set_cipher_list(ssl, dc->szCipherSuite)) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0,
++                         r->server,
++                         "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) "
++                         "permitted SSL ciphers");
++            ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++
++            if (cipher_list_old) {
++                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old);
++            }
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */
++        cipher_list = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
++
++        if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) {
++            /* optimized way */
++            if ((!cipher && cipher_list) ||
++                (cipher && !cipher_list))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++            else if (cipher && cipher_list &&
++                     (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, cipher) < 0))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++        }
++        else {
++            /* paranoid way */
++            if ((!cipher_list_old && cipher_list) ||
++                (cipher_list_old && !cipher_list))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++            else if (cipher_list_old && cipher_list) {
++                for (n = 0;
++                     !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list));
++                     n++)
++                {
++                    SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list, n);
++
++                    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list_old, value) < 0) {
++                        renegotiate = TRUE;
++                    }
++                }
++
++                for (n = 0;
++                     !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list_old));
++                     n++)
++                {
++                    SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list_old, n);
++
++                    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, value) < 0) {
++                        renegotiate = TRUE;
++                    }
++                }
++            }
++        }
++
++        /* cleanup */
++        if (cipher_list_old) {
++            sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old);
++        }
++
++        /* tracing */
++        if (renegotiate) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Reconfigured cipher suite will force renegotiation");
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override of SSLVerifyDepth
++     *
++     * The depth checks are handled by us manually inside the verify callback
++     * function and not by OpenSSL internally (and our function is aware of
++     * both the per-server and per-directory contexts). So we cannot ask
++     * OpenSSL about the currently verify depth. Instead we remember it in our
++     * ap_ctx attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL.  We've to force the
++     * renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify depth is less than the
++     * currently active/remembered verify depth (because this means more
++     * restriction on the certificate chain).
++     */
++    if (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) {
++        /* XXX: doesnt look like sslconn->verify_depth is actually used */
++        if (!(n = sslconn->verify_depth)) {
++            sslconn->verify_depth = n = sc->server->auth.verify_depth;
++        }
++
++        /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */
++        if (dc->nVerifyDepth < n) {
++            renegotiate = TRUE;
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Reduced client verification depth will force "
++                         "renegotiation");
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override of SSLVerifyClient
++     *
++     * We force a renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify type is
++     * stronger than the currently active verify type. 
++     *
++     * The order is: none << optional_no_ca << optional << require
++     *
++     * Additionally the following optimization is possible here: When the
++     * currently active verify type is "none" but a client certificate is
++     * already known/present, it's enough to manually force a client
++     * verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotation
++     * handshake.
++     */
++    if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) {
++        /* remember old state */
++        verify_old = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl);
++        /* configure new state */
++        verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
++
++        if (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) {
++            verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT;
++        }
++
++        if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) ||
++            (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
++        {
++            verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
++        }
++
++        modssl_set_verify(ssl, verify, ssl_callback_SSLVerify);
++        SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
++
++        /* determine whether we've to force a renegotiation */
++        if (!renegotiate && verify != verify_old) {
++            if (((verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) &&
++                 (verify     != SSL_VERIFY_NONE)) ||
++
++                (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
++                  (verify     & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) ||
++
++                (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT) &&
++                  (verify     & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT)))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++                /* optimization */
++
++                if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) &&
++                    (verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) &&
++                    ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) != NULL))
++                {
++                    renegotiate_quick = TRUE;
++                    X509_free(peercert);
++                }
++
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0,
++                             r->server,
++                             "Changed client verification type will force "
++                             "%srenegotiation",
++                             renegotiate_quick ? "quick " : "");
++             }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override SSLCACertificateFile & SSLCACertificatePath
++     * This is only enabled if the SSL_set_cert_store() function
++     * is available in the ssl library.  the 1.x based mod_ssl
++     * used SSL_CTX_set_cert_store which is not thread safe.
++     */
++
++#ifdef HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE
++    /*
++     * check if per-dir and per-server config field are not the same.
++     * if f is defined in per-dir and not defined in per-server
++     * or f is defined in both but not the equal ...
++     */
++#define MODSSL_CFG_NE(f) \
++     (dc->f && (!sc->f || (sc->f && strNE(dc->f, sc->f))))
++
++#define MODSSL_CFG_CA(f) \
++     (dc->f ? dc->f : sc->f)
++
++    if (MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificateFile) ||
++        MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificatePath))
++    {
++        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list;
++        const char *ca_file = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificateFile);
++        const char *ca_path = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificatePath);
++
++        cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
++
++        if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(cert_store, ca_file, ca_path)) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                         "Unable to reconfigure verify locations "
++                         "for client authentication");
++            ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++
++            X509_STORE_free(cert_store);
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        /* SSL_free will free cert_store */
++        SSL_set_cert_store(ssl, cert_store);
++
++        if (!(ca_list = ssl_init_FindCAList(r->server, r->pool,
++                                            ca_file, ca_path)))
++        {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                         "Unable to determine list of available "
++                         "CA certificates for client authentication");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, ca_list);
++        renegotiate = TRUE;
++
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                     "Changed client verification locations will force "
++                     "renegotiation");
++    }
++#endif /* HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE */
++
++    /* 
++     * SSL renegotiations in conjunction with HTTP
++     * requests using the POST method are not supported.
++     *
++     * Background:
++     *
++     * 1. When the client sends a HTTP/HTTPS request, Apache's core code
++     * reads only the request line ("METHOD /path HTTP/x.y") and the
++     * attached MIME headers ("Foo: bar") up to the terminating line ("CR
++     * LF"). An attached request body (for instance the data of a POST
++     * method) is _NOT_ read. Instead it is read by mod_cgi's content
++     * handler and directly passed to the CGI script.
++     *
++     * 2. mod_ssl supports per-directory re-configuration of SSL parameters.
++     * This is implemented by performing an SSL renegotiation of the
++     * re-configured parameters after the request is read, but before the
++     * response is sent. In more detail: the renegotiation happens after the
++     * request line and MIME headers were read, but _before_ the attached
++     * request body is read. The reason simply is that in the HTTP protocol
++     * usually there is no acknowledgment step between the headers and the
++     * body (there is the 100-continue feature and the chunking facility
++     * only), so Apache has no API hook for this step.
++     *
++     * 3. the problem now occurs when the client sends a POST request for
++     * URL /foo via HTTPS the server and the server has SSL parameters
++     * re-configured on a per-URL basis for /foo. Then mod_ssl has to
++     * perform an SSL renegotiation after the request was read and before
++     * the response is sent. But the problem is the pending POST body data
++     * in the receive buffer of SSL (which Apache still has not read - it's
++     * pending until mod_cgi sucks it in). When mod_ssl now tries to perform
++     * the renegotiation the pending data leads to an I/O error.
++     *
++     * Solution Idea:
++     *
++     * There are only two solutions: Either to simply state that POST
++     * requests to URLs with SSL re-configurations are not allowed, or to
++     * renegotiate really after the _complete_ request (i.e. including
++     * the POST body) was read. Obviously the latter would be preferred,
++     * but it cannot be done easily inside Apache, because as already
++     * mentioned, there is no API step between the body reading and the body
++     * processing. And even when we mod_ssl would hook directly into the
++     * loop of mod_cgi, we wouldn't solve the problem for other handlers, of
++     * course. So the only general solution is to suck in the pending data
++     * of the request body from the OpenSSL BIO into the Apache BUFF. Then
++     * the renegotiation can be done and after this step Apache can proceed
++     * processing the request as before.
++     *
++     * Solution Implementation:
++     *
++     * We cannot simply suck in the data via an SSL_read-based loop because of
++     * HTTP chunking. Instead we _have_ to use the Apache API for this step which
++     * is aware of HTTP chunking. So the trick is to suck in the pending request
++     * data via the Apache API (which uses Apache's BUFF code and in the
++     * background mod_ssl's I/O glue code) and re-inject it later into the Apache
++     * BUFF code again. This way the data flows twice through the Apache BUFF, of
++     * course. But this way the solution doesn't depend on any Apache specifics
++     * and is fully transparent to Apache modules.
++     *
++     * !! BUT ALL THIS IS STILL NOT RE-IMPLEMENTED FOR APACHE 2.0 !!
++     */
++    if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick && (r->method_number == M_POST)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                     "SSL Re-negotiation in conjunction "
++                     "with POST method not supported!\n"
++                     "hint: try SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate");
++
++        return HTTP_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * now do the renegotiation if anything was actually reconfigured
++     */
++    if (renegotiate) {
++        /*
++         * Now we force the SSL renegotation by sending the Hello Request
++         * message to the client. Here we have to do a workaround: Actually
++         * OpenSSL returns immediately after sending the Hello Request (the
++         * intent AFAIK is because the SSL/TLS protocol says it's not a must
++         * that the client replies to a Hello Request). But because we insist
++         * on a reply (anything else is an error for us) we have to go to the
++         * ACCEPT state manually. Using SSL_set_accept_state() doesn't work
++         * here because it resets too much of the connection.  So we set the
++         * state explicitly and continue the handshake manually.
++         */
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                     "Requesting connection re-negotiation");
++
++        if (renegotiate_quick) {
++            STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack;
++
++            /* perform just a manual re-verification of the peer */
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Performing quick renegotiation: "
++                         "just re-verifying the peer");
++
++            cert_stack = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl);
++
++            cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
++
++            if (!cert_stack && cert) {
++                /* client cert is in the session cache, but there is
++                 * no chain, since ssl3_get_client_certificate()
++                 * sk_X509_shift-ed the peer cert out of the chain.
++                 * we put it back here for the purpose of quick_renegotiation.
++                 */
++                cert_stack = sk_new_null();
++                sk_X509_push(cert_stack, MODSSL_PCHAR_CAST cert);
++            }
++
++            if (!cert_stack || (sk_X509_num(cert_stack) == 0)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Cannot find peer certificate chain");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (!(cert_store ||
++                  (cert_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))))
++            {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Cannot find certificate storage");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (!cert) {
++                cert = sk_X509_value(cert_stack, 0);
++            }
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_store_ctx, cert_store, cert, cert_stack);
++            depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(ssl);
++
++            if (depth >= 0) {
++                X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&cert_store_ctx, depth);
++            }
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&cert_store_ctx,
++                                       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),
++                                       (char *)ssl);
++
++            if (!modssl_X509_verify_cert(&cert_store_ctx)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation verification step failed");
++                ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++            }
++
++            SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, cert_store_ctx.error);
++            X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_store_ctx);
++
++            if (cert_stack != SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl)) {
++                /* we created this ourselves, so free it */
++                sk_X509_pop_free(cert_stack, X509_free);
++            }
++        }
++        else {
++            request_rec *id = r->main ? r->main : r;
++
++            /* do a full renegotiation */
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Performing full renegotiation: "
++                         "complete handshake protocol");
++
++            SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl,
++                                       (unsigned char *)&id,
++                                       sizeof(id));
++
++            SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
++            SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
++
++            if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation request failed");
++
++                r->connection->aborted = 1;
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Awaiting re-negotiation handshake");
++
++            SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL_ST_ACCEPT);
++            SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
++
++            if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                        "Not accepted by client!?");
++
++                r->connection->aborted = 1;
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Remember the peer certificate's DN
++         */
++        if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))) {
++            if (sslconn->client_cert) {
++                X509_free(sslconn->client_cert);
++            }
++            sslconn->client_cert = cert;
++            sslconn->client_dn = NULL;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results
++         */
++        if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) {
++            BOOL do_verify = (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE);
++
++            if (do_verify && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                             "Client verification failed");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (do_verify) {
++                if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) == NULL) {
++                    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                                 "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                                 "Client certificate missing");
++
++                    return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++                }
++
++                X509_free(peercert);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check SSLRequire boolean expressions
++     */
++    requires = dc->aRequirement;
++    ssl_requires = (ssl_require_t *)requires->elts;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < requires->nelts; i++) {
++        ssl_require_t *req = &ssl_requires[i];
++        ok = ssl_expr_exec(r, req->mpExpr);
++
++        if (ok < 0) {
++            cp = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
++                              "Failed to execute "
++                              "SSL requirement expression: %s",
++                              ssl_expr_get_error());
++
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                          "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                          r->filename, cp);
++
++            /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++            apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        if (ok != 1) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Access to %s denied for %s "
++                         "(requirement expression not fulfilled)",
++                         r->filename, r->connection->remote_ip);
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Failed expression: %s", req->cpExpr);
++
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                          "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                          r->filename,
++                          "SSL requirement expression not fulfilled "
++                          "(see SSL logfile for more details)");
++
++            /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++            apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Else access is granted from our point of view (except vendor
++     * handlers override). But we have to return DECLINED here instead
++     * of OK, because mod_auth and other modules still might want to
++     * deny access.
++     */
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  Authentication Handler:
++ *  Fake a Basic authentication from the X509 client certificate.
++ *
++ *  This must be run fairly early on to prevent a real authentication from
++ *  occuring, in particular it must be run before anything else that
++ *  authenticates a user.  This means that the Module statement for this
++ *  module should be LAST in the Configuration file.
++ */
++int ssl_hook_UserCheck(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    char buf1[MAX_STRING_LEN], buf2[MAX_STRING_LEN];
++    char *clientdn;
++    const char *auth_line, *username, *password;
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally forbid access (again)
++     * when strict require option is used.
++     */
++    if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) &&
++        (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden")))
++    {
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * We decline when we are in a subrequest.  The Authorization header
++     * would already be present if it was added in the main request.
++     */
++    if (!ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Make sure the user is not able to fake the client certificate
++     * based authentication by just entering an X.509 Subject DN
++     * ("/XX=YYY/XX=YYY/..") as the username and "password" as the
++     * password.
++     */
++    if ((auth_line = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Authorization"))) {
++        if (strcEQ(ap_getword(r->pool, &auth_line, ' '), "Basic")) {
++            while ((*auth_line == ' ') || (*auth_line == '\t')) {
++                auth_line++;
++            }
++
++            auth_line = ap_pbase64decode(r->pool, auth_line);
++            username = ap_getword_nulls(r->pool, &auth_line, ':');
++            password = auth_line;
++
++            if ((username[0] == '/') && strEQ(password, "password")) {
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
++                    "Encountered FakeBasicAuth spoof: %s", username);
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * We decline operation in various situations...
++     * - SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth not configured
++     * - r->user already authenticated
++     * - ssl not enabled
++     * - client did not present a certificate
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled && sslconn->ssl && sslconn->client_cert) ||
++        !(dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) || r->user)
++    {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++    
++    if (!sslconn->client_dn) {
++        X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(sslconn->client_cert);
++        char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0);
++        sslconn->client_dn = apr_pstrdup(r->connection->pool, cp);
++        modssl_free(cp);
++    }
++
++    clientdn = (char *)sslconn->client_dn;
++
++    /*
++     * Fake a password - which one would be immaterial, as, it seems, an empty
++     * password in the users file would match ALL incoming passwords, if only
++     * we were using the standard crypt library routine. Unfortunately, OpenSSL
++     * "fixes" a "bug" in crypt and thus prevents blank passwords from
++     * working.  (IMHO what they really fix is a bug in the users of the code
++     * - failing to program correctly for shadow passwords).  We need,
++     * therefore, to provide a password. This password can be matched by
++     * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file.
++     * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-)
++     */
++    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%s:password", clientdn);
++    ssl_util_uuencode(buf2, buf1, FALSE);
++
++    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "Basic %s", buf2);
++    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", buf1);
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", buf1);
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/* authorization phase */
++int ssl_hook_Auth(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally forbid access (again)
++     * when strict require option is used.
++     */
++    if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) &&
++        (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden")))
++    {
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *   Fixup Handler
++ */
++
++static const char *ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[] = {
++    "SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE",
++    "SSL_VERSION_LIBRARY",
++    "SSL_PROTOCOL",
++    "SSL_CIPHER",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_M_VERSION",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_M_SERIAL",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_V_START",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_V_END",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_C",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_L",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_T",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_I",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_G",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_S",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_D",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_C",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_L",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_O",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_T",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_I",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_G",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_S",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_D",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_A_KEY",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_A_SIG",
++    "SSL_SERVER_M_VERSION",
++    "SSL_SERVER_M_SERIAL",
++    "SSL_SERVER_V_START",
++    "SSL_SERVER_V_END",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_C",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_L",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_O",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_T",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_I",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_G",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_S",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_D",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_C",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_L",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_O",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_T",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_I",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_G",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_S",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_D",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_SERVER_A_KEY",
++    "SSL_SERVER_A_SIG",
++    "SSL_SESSION_ID",
++    NULL
++};
++
++int ssl_hook_Fixup(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    apr_table_t *env = r->subprocess_env;
++    char *var, *val = "";
++    STACK_OF(X509) *peer_certs;
++    SSL *ssl;
++    int i;
++
++    /*
++     * Check to see if SSL is on
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled && sslconn && (ssl = sslconn->ssl))) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Annotate the SSI/CGI environment with standard SSL information
++     */
++    /* the always present HTTPS (=HTTP over SSL) flag! */
++    apr_table_setn(env, "HTTPS", "on"); 
++
++    /* standard SSL environment variables */
++    if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STDENVVARS) {
++        for (i = 0; ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; i++) {
++            var = (char *)ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i];
++            val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, r, var);
++            if (!strIsEmpty(val)) {
++                apr_table_setn(env, var, val);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * On-demand bloat up the SSI/CGI environment with certificate data
++     */
++    if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_EXPORTCERTDATA) {
++        val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                             r, "SSL_SERVER_CERT");
++
++        apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_SERVER_CERT", val);
++
++        val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                             r, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT");
++
++        apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT", val);
++
++        if ((peer_certs = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) {
++            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(peer_certs); i++) {
++                var = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT_CHAIN_%d", i);
++                val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                                     r, var);
++                if (val) {
++                    apr_table_setn(env, var, val);
++                }
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*  _________________________________________________________________
++**
++**  OpenSSL Callback Functions
++**  _________________________________________________________________
++*/
++
++/*
++ * Handle out temporary RSA private keys on demand
++ *
++ * The background of this as the TLSv1 standard explains it:
++ *
++ * | D.1. Temporary RSA keys
++ * |
++ * |    US Export restrictions limit RSA keys used for encryption to 512
++ * |    bits, but do not place any limit on lengths of RSA keys used for
++ * |    signing operations. Certificates often need to be larger than 512
++ * |    bits, since 512-bit RSA keys are not secure enough for high-value
++ * |    transactions or for applications requiring long-term security. Some
++ * |    certificates are also designated signing-only, in which case they
++ * |    cannot be used for key exchange.
++ * |
++ * |    When the public key in the certificate cannot be used for encryption,
++ * |    the server signs a temporary RSA key, which is then exchanged. In
++ * |    exportable applications, the temporary RSA key should be the maximum
++ * |    allowable length (i.e., 512 bits). Because 512-bit RSA keys are
++ * |    relatively insecure, they should be changed often. For typical
++ * |    electronic commerce applications, it is suggested that keys be
++ * |    changed daily or every 500 transactions, and more often if possible.
++ * |    Note that while it is acceptable to use the same temporary key for
++ * |    multiple transactions, it must be signed each time it is used.
++ * |
++ * |    RSA key generation is a time-consuming process. In many cases, a
++ * |    low-priority process can be assigned the task of key generation.
++ * |    Whenever a new key is completed, the existing temporary key can be
++ * |    replaced with the new one.
++ *
++ * XXX: base on comment above, if thread support is enabled,
++ * we should spawn a low-priority thread to generate new keys
++ * on the fly.
++ *
++ * So we generated 512 and 1024 bit temporary keys on startup
++ * which we now just hand out on demand....
++ */
++
++RSA *ssl_callback_TmpRSA(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
++    int idx;
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c->base_server,
++                 "handing out temporary %d bit RSA key", keylen);
++
++    /* doesn't matter if export flag is on,
++     * we won't be asked for keylen > 512 in that case.
++     * if we are asked for a keylen > 1024, it is too expensive
++     * to generate on the fly.
++     * XXX: any reason not to generate 2048 bit keys at startup?
++     */
++
++    switch (keylen) {
++      case 512:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_512;
++        break;
++
++      case 1024:
++      default:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_1024;
++    }
++
++    return (RSA *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx];
++}
++
++/* 
++ * Hand out the already generated DH parameters...
++ */
++DH *ssl_callback_TmpDH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
++    int idx;
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c->base_server,
++                 "handing out temporary %d bit DH key", keylen);
++
++    switch (keylen) {
++      case 512:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_512;
++        break;
++
++      case 1024:
++      default:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024;
++    }
++
++    return (DH *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx];
++}
++
++/*
++ * This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL
++ * does client authentication and verifies the certificate chain.
++ */
++int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    SSL *ssl            = (SSL *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
++    conn_rec *conn      = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s       = conn->base_server;
++    request_rec *r      = (request_rec *)SSL_get_app_data2(ssl);
++
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = r ? myDirConfig(r) : NULL;
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(conn);
++    modssl_ctx_t *mctx  = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
++
++    /* Get verify ingredients */
++    int errnum   = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
++    int errdepth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
++    int depth, verify;
++
++    /*
++     * Log verification information
++     */
++    if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        X509 *cert  = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
++        char *sname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0);
++        char *iname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert),  NULL, 0);
++
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: "
++                     "depth: %d, subject: %s, issuer: %s",
++                     errdepth,
++                     sname ? sname : "-unknown-",
++                     iname ? iname : "-unknown-");
++
++        if (sname) {
++            modssl_free(sname);
++        }
++
++        if (iname) {
++            modssl_free(iname);
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check for optionally acceptable non-verifiable issuer situation
++     */
++    if (dc && (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) {
++        verify = dc->nVerifyClient;
++    }
++    else {
++        verify = mctx->auth.verify_mode;
++    }
++
++    if (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) {
++        /* 
++         * SSLProxyVerify is either not configured or set to "none".
++         * (this callback doesn't happen in the server context if SSLVerify
++         *  is not configured or set to "none")
++         */
++        return TRUE;
++    }
++
++    if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(errnum) &&
++        (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
++    {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Verifiable Issuer is "
++                     "configured as optional, therefore we're accepting "
++                     "the certificate");
++
++        sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS";
++        ok = TRUE;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally perform CRL-based revocation checks
++     */
++    if (ok) {
++        if (!(ok = ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(ok, ctx, conn))) {
++            errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason
++     */
++    if (!ok) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s",
++                     errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum));
++
++        if (sslconn->client_cert) {
++            X509_free(sslconn->client_cert);
++            sslconn->client_cert = NULL;
++        }
++        sslconn->client_dn = NULL;
++        sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Finally check the depth of the certificate verification
++     */
++    if (dc && (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET)) {
++        depth = dc->nVerifyDepth;
++    }
++    else {
++        depth = mctx->auth.verify_depth;
++    }
++
++    if (errdepth > depth) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long "
++                     "(chain has %d certificates, but maximum allowed are "
++                     "only %d)",
++                     errdepth, depth);
++
++        errnum = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
++        sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum);
++
++        ok = FALSE;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * And finally signal OpenSSL the (perhaps changed) state
++     */
++    return ok;
++}
++
++int ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, conn_rec *c)
++{
++    server_rec *s       = c->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c);
++    modssl_ctx_t *mctx  = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
++    X509_OBJECT obj;
++    X509_NAME *subject, *issuer;
++    X509 *cert;
++    X509_CRL *crl;
++    EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
++    int i, n, rc;
++
++    /*
++     * Unless a revocation store for CRLs was created we
++     * cannot do any CRL-based verification, of course.
++     */
++    if (!mctx->crl) {
++        return ok;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Determine certificate ingredients in advance
++     */
++    cert    = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
++    subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
++    issuer  = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
++
++    /*
++     * OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does not
++     * use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it
++     * explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked
++     * certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store.
++     *
++     * We come through this procedure for each certificate in the certificate
++     * chain, starting with the root-CA's certificate. At each step we've to
++     * both verify the signature on the CRL (to make sure it's a valid CRL)
++     * and it's revocation list (to make sure the current certificate isn't
++     * revoked).  But because to check the signature on the CRL we need the
++     * public key of the issuing CA certificate (which was already processed
++     * one round before), we've a little problem. But we can both solve it and
++     * at the same time optimize the processing by using the following
++     * verification scheme (idea and code snippets borrowed from the GLOBUS
++     * project):
++     *
++     * 1. We'll check the signature of a CRL in each step when we find a CRL
++     *    through the _subject_ name of the current certificate. This CRL
++     *    itself will be needed the first time in the next round, of course.
++     *    But we do the signature processing one round before this where the
++     *    public key of the CA is available.
++     *
++     * 2. We'll check the revocation list of a CRL in each step when
++     *    we find a CRL through the _issuer_ name of the current certificate.
++     *    This CRLs signature was then already verified one round before.
++     *
++     * This verification scheme allows a CA to revoke its own certificate as
++     * well, of course.
++     */
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
++     * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity.
++     */
++    memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
++    rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl,
++                               X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
++    crl = obj.data.crl;
++
++    if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
++        /*
++         * Log information about CRL
++         * (A little bit complicated because of ASN.1 and BIOs...)
++         */
++        if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++            char buff[512]; /* should be plenty */
++            BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, "CA CRL: Issuer: ");
++            X509_NAME_print(bio, issuer, 0);
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, ", lastUpdate: ");
++            ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl));
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, ", nextUpdate: ");
++            ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
++
++            n = BIO_read(bio, buff, sizeof(buff));
++            buff[n] = '\0';
++
++            BIO_free(bio);
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, buff);
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Verify the signature on this CRL
++         */
++        pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
++        rc = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pubkey);
++#ifdef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
++        /* Only refcounted in OpenSSL */
++        if (pubkey)
++            EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
++#endif
++        if (rc <= 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Invalid signature on CRL");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Check date of CRL to make sure it's not expired
++         */
++        i = X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
++
++        if (i == 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,
++                                     X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        if (i < 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Found CRL is expired - "
++                         "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
++     * the current certificate in order to check for revocation.
++     */
++    memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
++    rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl,
++                               X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
++
++    crl = obj.data.crl;
++    if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
++        /*
++         * Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL
++         */
++        n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
++
++        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
++            X509_REVOKED *revoked =
++                sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
++
++            ASN1_INTEGER *sn = X509_REVOKED_get_serialNumber(revoked);
++
++            if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) {
++                if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++                    char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0);
++                    long serial = ASN1_INTEGER_get(sn);
++
++                    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s,
++                                 "Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) "
++                                 "revoked per CRL from issuer %s",
++                                 serial, serial, cp);
++                    modssl_free(cp);
++                }
++
++                X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
++                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++                return FALSE;
++            }
++        }
++
++        X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++    }
++
++    return ok;
++}
++
++#define SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT \
++   "Proxy client certificate callback: (%s) "
++
++static void modssl_proxy_info_log(server_rec *s,
++                                  X509_INFO *info,
++                                  const char *msg)
++{
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    char name_buf[256];
++    X509_NAME *name;
++    char *dn;
++
++    if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    name = X509_get_subject_name(info->x509);
++    dn = X509_NAME_oneline(name, name_buf, sizeof(name_buf));
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "%s, sending %s", 
++                 sc->vhost_id, msg, dn ? dn : "-uknown-");
++}
++
++/*
++ * caller will decrement the cert and key reference
++ * so we need to increment here to prevent them from
++ * being freed.
++ */
++#define modssl_set_cert_info(info, cert, pkey) \
++    *cert = info->x509; \
++    X509_reference_inc(*cert); \
++    *pkey = info->x_pkey->dec_pkey; \
++    EVP_PKEY_reference_inc(*pkey)
++
++int ssl_callback_proxy_cert(SSL *ssl, MODSSL_CLIENT_CERT_CB_ARG_TYPE **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s = c->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    X509_NAME *ca_name, *issuer;
++    X509_INFO *info;
++    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list;
++    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *certs = sc->proxy->pkp->certs;
++    int i, j;
++    
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, 
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "entered",
++                 sc->vhost_id);
++
++    if (!certs || (sk_X509_INFO_num(certs) <= 0)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                     SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT
++                     "downstream server wanted client certificate "
++                     "but none are configured", sc->vhost_id);
++        return FALSE;
++    }                                                                     
++
++    ca_list = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
++
++    if (!ca_list || (sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list) <= 0)) {
++        /* 
++         * downstream server didn't send us a list of acceptable CA certs, 
++         * so we send the first client cert in the list.
++         */   
++        info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, 0);
++        
++        modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "no acceptable CA list");
++
++        modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey);
++
++        return TRUE;
++    }         
++
++    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list); i++) {
++        ca_name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_list, i);
++
++        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_INFO_num(certs); j++) {
++            info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, j);
++            issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(info->x509);
++
++            if (X509_NAME_cmp(issuer, ca_name) == 0) {
++                modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "found acceptable cert");
++
++                modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey);
++
++                return TRUE;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT
++                 "no client certificate found!?", sc->vhost_id);
++
++    return FALSE; 
++}
++
++static void ssl_session_log(server_rec *s,
++                            const char *request,
++                            unsigned char *id,
++                            unsigned int idlen,
++                            const char *status,
++                            const char *result,
++                            long timeout)
++{
++    char buf[SSL_SESSION_ID_STRING_LEN];
++    char timeout_str[56] = {'\0'};
++
++    if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    if (timeout) {
++        apr_snprintf(timeout_str, sizeof(timeout_str),
++                     "timeout=%lds ", (timeout - time(NULL)));
++    }
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 "Inter-Process Session Cache: "
++                 "request=%s status=%s id=%s %s(session %s)",
++                 request, status,
++                 SSL_SESSION_id2sz(id, idlen, buf, sizeof(buf)),
++                 timeout_str, result);
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a new SSL_SESSION is
++ *  added to the internal OpenSSL session cache. We use this hook to spread the
++ *  SSL_SESSION also to the inter-process disk-cache to make share it with our
++ *  other Apache pre-forked server processes.
++ */
++int ssl_callback_NewSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    conn_rec *conn      = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s       = conn->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    long timeout        = sc->session_cache_timeout;
++    BOOL rc;
++    unsigned char *id;
++    unsigned int idlen;
++
++    /*
++     * Set the timeout also for the internal OpenSSL cache, because this way
++     * our inter-process cache is consulted only when it's really necessary.
++     */
++    SSL_set_timeout(session, timeout);
++
++    /*
++     * Store the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process cache with the
++     * same expire time, so it expires automatically there, too.
++     */
++    id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session);
++    idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session);
++
++    timeout += modssl_session_get_time(session);
++
++    rc = ssl_scache_store(s, id, idlen, timeout, session);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "SET", id, idlen,
++                    rc == TRUE ? "OK" : "BAD",
++                    "caching", timeout);
++
++    /*
++     * return 0 which means to OpenSSL that the session is still
++     * valid and was not freed by us with SSL_SESSION_free().
++     */
++    return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a
++ *  SSL_SESSION is looked up in the internal OpenSSL cache and it
++ *  was not found. We use this to lookup the SSL_SESSION in the
++ *  inter-process disk-cache where it was perhaps stored by one
++ *  of our other Apache pre-forked server processes.
++ */
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_callback_GetSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl,
++                                               unsigned char *id,
++                                               int idlen, int *do_copy)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s  = conn->base_server;
++    SSL_SESSION *session;
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
++     */
++    session = ssl_scache_retrieve(s, id, idlen);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "GET", id, idlen,
++                    session ? "FOUND" : "MISSED",
++                    session ? "reuse" : "renewal", 0);
++
++    /*
++     * Return NULL or the retrieved SSL_SESSION. But indicate (by
++     * setting do_copy to 0) that the reference count on the
++     * SSL_SESSION should not be incremented by the SSL library,
++     * because we will no longer hold a reference to it ourself.
++     */
++    *do_copy = 0;
++
++    return session;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a
++ *  SSL_SESSION is removed from the the internal OpenSSL cache.
++ *  We use this to remove the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process
++ *  disk-cache, too.
++ */
++void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx,
++                                       SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++    server_rec *s;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
++    unsigned char *id;
++    unsigned int idlen;
++
++    /*
++     * Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context
++     */
++    if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) {
++        return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */
++    }
++
++    sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++
++    /*
++     * Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
++     */
++    id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session);
++    idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session);
++
++    ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen,
++                    "OK", "dead", 0);
++
++    return;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This callback function is executed while OpenSSL processes the
++ * SSL handshake and does SSL record layer stuff. We use it to
++ * trace OpenSSL's processing in out SSL logfile.
++ */
++void ssl_callback_LogTracingState(MODSSL_INFO_CB_ARG_TYPE ssl, int where, int rc)
++{
++    conn_rec *c;
++    server_rec *s;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
++
++    /*
++     * find corresponding server
++     */
++    if (!(c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data((SSL *)ssl))) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    s = c->base_server;
++    if (!(sc = mySrvConfig(s))) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * create the various trace messages
++     */
++    if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Handshake: start", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Handshake: done", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Loop: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_READ) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Read: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Write: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
++            char *str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Alert: %s:%s:%s\n",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, str,
++                         SSL_alert_type_string_long(rc),
++                         SSL_alert_desc_string_long(rc));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
++            if (rc == 0) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                             "%s: Exit: failed in %s",
++                             SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++            }
++            else if (rc < 0) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                             "%s: Exit: error in %s",
++                             SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Because SSL renegotations can happen at any time (not only after
++     * SSL_accept()), the best way to log the current connection details is
++     * right after a finished handshake.
++     */
++    if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s,
++                     "Connection: Client IP: %s, Protocol: %s, "
++                     "Cipher: %s (%s/%s bits)",
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "REMOTE_ADDR"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_PROTOCOL"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE"));
++    }
++}
++
diff --git a/net-www/apache/files/patches/2.0.49-r1/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch b/net-www/apache/files/patches/2.0.49-r1/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4caf45f2041f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-www/apache/files/patches/2.0.49-r1/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1842 @@
+diff -Naur httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
+--- httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c	2004-02-09 20:53:20.000000000 +0000
++++ httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c	2004-05-29 09:39:18.605535640 +0000
+@@ -793,7 +793,6 @@
+     SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
+     SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
+     SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
+-    char buf1[MAX_STRING_LEN], buf2[MAX_STRING_LEN];
+     char *clientdn;
+     const char *auth_line, *username, *password;
+ 
+@@ -872,14 +871,16 @@
+      * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file.
+      * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-)
+      */
+-    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%s:password", clientdn);
+-    ssl_util_uuencode(buf2, buf1, FALSE);
+-
+-    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "Basic %s", buf2);
+-    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", buf1);
++    auth_line = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "Basic ", 
++                            ap_pbase64encode(r->pool, 
++                                             apr_pstrcat(r->pool, clientdn, 
++                                                         ":password", NULL)),
++                            NULL);
++    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", auth_line);
+ 
+     ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
+-                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", buf1);
++                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"",
++                 auth_line);
+ 
+     return DECLINED;
+ }
+diff -Naur httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig
+--- httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig	2004-02-09 20:53:20.000000000 +0000
+@@ -0,0 +1,1804 @@
++/* Copyright 2001-2004 The Apache Software Foundation
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
++ *
++ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
++ *
++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
++ * limitations under the License.
++ */
++
++/*                      _             _
++ *  _ __ ___   ___   __| |    ___ ___| |  mod_ssl
++ * | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` |   / __/ __| |  Apache Interface to OpenSSL
++ * | | | | | | (_) | (_| |   \__ \__ \ |
++ * |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_|
++ *                      |_____|
++ *  ssl_engine_kernel.c
++ *  The SSL engine kernel
++ */
++                             /* ``It took me fifteen years to discover
++                                  I had no talent for programming, but
++                                  I couldn't give it up because by that
++                                  time I was too famous.''
++                                            -- Unknown                */
++#include "mod_ssl.h"
++
++/*
++ *  Post Read Request Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSL *ssl;
++
++    if (!sslconn) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    if (sslconn->non_ssl_request) {
++        const char *errmsg;
++        char *thisurl;
++        char *thisport = "";
++        int port = ap_get_server_port(r);
++
++        if (!ap_is_default_port(port, r)) {
++            thisport = apr_psprintf(r->pool, ":%u", port);
++        }
++
++        thisurl = ap_escape_html(r->pool,
++                                 apr_psprintf(r->pool, "https://%s%s/",
++                                              ap_get_server_name(r),
++                                              thisport));
++
++        errmsg = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
++                              "Reason: You're speaking plain HTTP "
++                              "to an SSL-enabled server port.<br />\n"
++                              "Instead use the HTTPS scheme to access "
++                              "this URL, please.<br />\n"
++                              "<blockquote>Hint: "
++                              "<a href=\"%s\"><b>%s</b></a></blockquote>",
++                              thisurl, thisurl);
++
++        apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", errmsg);
++
++        /* Now that we have caught this error, forget it. we are done
++         * with using SSL on this request.
++         */
++        sslconn->non_ssl_request = 0;
++        
++
++        return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Get the SSL connection structure and perform the
++     * delayed interlinking from SSL back to request_rec
++     */
++    if ((ssl = sslconn->ssl)) {
++        SSL_set_app_data2(ssl, r);
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Move SetEnvIf information from request_rec to conn_rec/BUFF
++ * to allow the close connection handler to use them.
++ */
++
++static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn)
++{
++    int i;
++    const apr_array_header_t *arr = apr_table_elts(r->subprocess_env);
++    const apr_table_entry_t *elts = (const apr_table_entry_t *)arr->elts;
++
++    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_STANDARD;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < arr->nelts; i++) {
++        const char *key = elts[i].key;
++
++        switch (*key) {
++          case 's':
++            /* being case-sensitive here.
++             * and not checking for the -shutdown since these are the only
++             * SetEnvIf "flags" we support
++             */
++            if (!strncmp(key+1, "sl-", 3)) {
++                key += 4;
++                if (!strncmp(key, "unclean", 7)) {
++                    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNCLEAN;
++                }
++                else if (!strncmp(key, "accurate", 8)) {
++                    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_ACCURATE;
++                }
++                return; /* should only ever be one ssl-*-shutdown */
++            }
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++}
++
++/*
++ *  URL Translation Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_Translate(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++
++    if (!(sslconn && sslconn->ssl)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Log information about incoming HTTPS requests
++     */
++    if (r->server->loglevel >= APLOG_INFO && ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                     "%s HTTPS request received for child %ld (server %s)",
++                     (r->connection->keepalives <= 0 ?
++                     "Initial (No.1)" :
++                     apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Subsequent (No.%d)",
++                                  r->connection->keepalives+1)),
++                     r->connection->id,
++                     ssl_util_vhostid(r->pool, r->server));
++    }
++
++    /* SetEnvIf ssl-*-shutdown flags can only be per-server,
++     * so they won't change across keepalive requests
++     */
++    if (sslconn->shutdown_type == SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNSET) {
++        ssl_configure_env(r, sslconn);
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  Access Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSL *ssl            = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL;
++    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    apr_array_header_t *requires;
++    ssl_require_t *ssl_requires;
++    char *cp;
++    int ok, i;
++    BOOL renegotiate = FALSE, renegotiate_quick = FALSE;
++    X509 *cert;
++    X509 *peercert;
++    X509_STORE *cert_store = NULL;
++    X509_STORE_CTX cert_store_ctx;
++    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_old = NULL, *cipher_list = NULL;
++    SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
++    int depth, verify_old, verify, n;
++
++    if (ssl) {
++        ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Support for SSLRequireSSL directive
++     */
++    if (dc->bSSLRequired && !ssl) {
++        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                      "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                      r->filename, "SSL connection required");
++
++        /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++        apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check to see if SSL protocol is on
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled || ssl)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++    /*
++     * Support for per-directory reconfigured SSL connection parameters.
++     *
++     * This is implemented by forcing an SSL renegotiation with the
++     * reconfigured parameter suite. But Apache's internal API processing
++     * makes our life very hard here, because when internal sub-requests occur
++     * we nevertheless should avoid multiple unnecessary SSL handshakes (they
++     * require extra network I/O and especially time to perform). 
++     * 
++     * But the optimization for filtering out the unnecessary handshakes isn't
++     * obvious and trivial.  Especially because while Apache is in its
++     * sub-request processing the client could force additional handshakes,
++     * too. And these take place perhaps without our notice. So the only
++     * possibility is to explicitly _ask_ OpenSSL whether the renegotiation
++     * has to be performed or not. It has to performed when some parameters
++     * which were previously known (by us) are not those we've now
++     * reconfigured (as known by OpenSSL) or (in optimized way) at least when
++     * the reconfigured parameter suite is stronger (more restrictions) than
++     * the currently active one.
++     */
++
++    /*
++     * Override of SSLCipherSuite
++     *
++     * We provide two options here:
++     *
++     * o The paranoid and default approach where we force a renegotiation when
++     *   the cipher suite changed in _any_ way (which is straight-forward but
++     *   often forces renegotiations too often and is perhaps not what the
++     *   user actually wanted).
++     *
++     * o The optimized and still secure way where we force a renegotiation
++     *   only if the currently active cipher is no longer contained in the
++     *   reconfigured/new cipher suite. Any other changes are not important
++     *   because it's the servers choice to select a cipher from the ones the
++     *   client supports. So as long as the current cipher is still in the new
++     *   cipher suite we're happy. Because we can assume we would have
++     *   selected it again even when other (better) ciphers exists now in the
++     *   new cipher suite. This approach is fine because the user explicitly
++     *   has to enable this via ``SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate''. So we do no
++     *   implicit optimizations.
++     */
++    if (dc->szCipherSuite) {
++        /* remember old state */
++
++        if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) {
++            cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
++        }
++        else {
++            cipher_list_old = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
++
++            if (cipher_list_old) {
++                cipher_list_old = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list_old);
++            }
++        }
++
++        /* configure new state */
++        if (!modssl_set_cipher_list(ssl, dc->szCipherSuite)) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0,
++                         r->server,
++                         "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) "
++                         "permitted SSL ciphers");
++            ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++
++            if (cipher_list_old) {
++                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old);
++            }
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */
++        cipher_list = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
++
++        if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) {
++            /* optimized way */
++            if ((!cipher && cipher_list) ||
++                (cipher && !cipher_list))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++            else if (cipher && cipher_list &&
++                     (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, cipher) < 0))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++        }
++        else {
++            /* paranoid way */
++            if ((!cipher_list_old && cipher_list) ||
++                (cipher_list_old && !cipher_list))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++            else if (cipher_list_old && cipher_list) {
++                for (n = 0;
++                     !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list));
++                     n++)
++                {
++                    SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list, n);
++
++                    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list_old, value) < 0) {
++                        renegotiate = TRUE;
++                    }
++                }
++
++                for (n = 0;
++                     !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list_old));
++                     n++)
++                {
++                    SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list_old, n);
++
++                    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, value) < 0) {
++                        renegotiate = TRUE;
++                    }
++                }
++            }
++        }
++
++        /* cleanup */
++        if (cipher_list_old) {
++            sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old);
++        }
++
++        /* tracing */
++        if (renegotiate) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Reconfigured cipher suite will force renegotiation");
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override of SSLVerifyDepth
++     *
++     * The depth checks are handled by us manually inside the verify callback
++     * function and not by OpenSSL internally (and our function is aware of
++     * both the per-server and per-directory contexts). So we cannot ask
++     * OpenSSL about the currently verify depth. Instead we remember it in our
++     * ap_ctx attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL.  We've to force the
++     * renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify depth is less than the
++     * currently active/remembered verify depth (because this means more
++     * restriction on the certificate chain).
++     */
++    if (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) {
++        /* XXX: doesnt look like sslconn->verify_depth is actually used */
++        if (!(n = sslconn->verify_depth)) {
++            sslconn->verify_depth = n = sc->server->auth.verify_depth;
++        }
++
++        /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */
++        if (dc->nVerifyDepth < n) {
++            renegotiate = TRUE;
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Reduced client verification depth will force "
++                         "renegotiation");
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override of SSLVerifyClient
++     *
++     * We force a renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify type is
++     * stronger than the currently active verify type. 
++     *
++     * The order is: none << optional_no_ca << optional << require
++     *
++     * Additionally the following optimization is possible here: When the
++     * currently active verify type is "none" but a client certificate is
++     * already known/present, it's enough to manually force a client
++     * verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotation
++     * handshake.
++     */
++    if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) {
++        /* remember old state */
++        verify_old = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl);
++        /* configure new state */
++        verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
++
++        if (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) {
++            verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT;
++        }
++
++        if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) ||
++            (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
++        {
++            verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
++        }
++
++        modssl_set_verify(ssl, verify, ssl_callback_SSLVerify);
++        SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
++
++        /* determine whether we've to force a renegotiation */
++        if (!renegotiate && verify != verify_old) {
++            if (((verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) &&
++                 (verify     != SSL_VERIFY_NONE)) ||
++
++                (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
++                  (verify     & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) ||
++
++                (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT) &&
++                  (verify     & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT)))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++                /* optimization */
++
++                if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) &&
++                    (verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) &&
++                    ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) != NULL))
++                {
++                    renegotiate_quick = TRUE;
++                    X509_free(peercert);
++                }
++
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0,
++                             r->server,
++                             "Changed client verification type will force "
++                             "%srenegotiation",
++                             renegotiate_quick ? "quick " : "");
++             }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override SSLCACertificateFile & SSLCACertificatePath
++     * This is only enabled if the SSL_set_cert_store() function
++     * is available in the ssl library.  the 1.x based mod_ssl
++     * used SSL_CTX_set_cert_store which is not thread safe.
++     */
++
++#ifdef HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE
++    /*
++     * check if per-dir and per-server config field are not the same.
++     * if f is defined in per-dir and not defined in per-server
++     * or f is defined in both but not the equal ...
++     */
++#define MODSSL_CFG_NE(f) \
++     (dc->f && (!sc->f || (sc->f && strNE(dc->f, sc->f))))
++
++#define MODSSL_CFG_CA(f) \
++     (dc->f ? dc->f : sc->f)
++
++    if (MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificateFile) ||
++        MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificatePath))
++    {
++        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list;
++        const char *ca_file = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificateFile);
++        const char *ca_path = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificatePath);
++
++        cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
++
++        if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(cert_store, ca_file, ca_path)) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                         "Unable to reconfigure verify locations "
++                         "for client authentication");
++            ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++
++            X509_STORE_free(cert_store);
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        /* SSL_free will free cert_store */
++        SSL_set_cert_store(ssl, cert_store);
++
++        if (!(ca_list = ssl_init_FindCAList(r->server, r->pool,
++                                            ca_file, ca_path)))
++        {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                         "Unable to determine list of available "
++                         "CA certificates for client authentication");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, ca_list);
++        renegotiate = TRUE;
++
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                     "Changed client verification locations will force "
++                     "renegotiation");
++    }
++#endif /* HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE */
++
++    /* 
++     * SSL renegotiations in conjunction with HTTP
++     * requests using the POST method are not supported.
++     *
++     * Background:
++     *
++     * 1. When the client sends a HTTP/HTTPS request, Apache's core code
++     * reads only the request line ("METHOD /path HTTP/x.y") and the
++     * attached MIME headers ("Foo: bar") up to the terminating line ("CR
++     * LF"). An attached request body (for instance the data of a POST
++     * method) is _NOT_ read. Instead it is read by mod_cgi's content
++     * handler and directly passed to the CGI script.
++     *
++     * 2. mod_ssl supports per-directory re-configuration of SSL parameters.
++     * This is implemented by performing an SSL renegotiation of the
++     * re-configured parameters after the request is read, but before the
++     * response is sent. In more detail: the renegotiation happens after the
++     * request line and MIME headers were read, but _before_ the attached
++     * request body is read. The reason simply is that in the HTTP protocol
++     * usually there is no acknowledgment step between the headers and the
++     * body (there is the 100-continue feature and the chunking facility
++     * only), so Apache has no API hook for this step.
++     *
++     * 3. the problem now occurs when the client sends a POST request for
++     * URL /foo via HTTPS the server and the server has SSL parameters
++     * re-configured on a per-URL basis for /foo. Then mod_ssl has to
++     * perform an SSL renegotiation after the request was read and before
++     * the response is sent. But the problem is the pending POST body data
++     * in the receive buffer of SSL (which Apache still has not read - it's
++     * pending until mod_cgi sucks it in). When mod_ssl now tries to perform
++     * the renegotiation the pending data leads to an I/O error.
++     *
++     * Solution Idea:
++     *
++     * There are only two solutions: Either to simply state that POST
++     * requests to URLs with SSL re-configurations are not allowed, or to
++     * renegotiate really after the _complete_ request (i.e. including
++     * the POST body) was read. Obviously the latter would be preferred,
++     * but it cannot be done easily inside Apache, because as already
++     * mentioned, there is no API step between the body reading and the body
++     * processing. And even when we mod_ssl would hook directly into the
++     * loop of mod_cgi, we wouldn't solve the problem for other handlers, of
++     * course. So the only general solution is to suck in the pending data
++     * of the request body from the OpenSSL BIO into the Apache BUFF. Then
++     * the renegotiation can be done and after this step Apache can proceed
++     * processing the request as before.
++     *
++     * Solution Implementation:
++     *
++     * We cannot simply suck in the data via an SSL_read-based loop because of
++     * HTTP chunking. Instead we _have_ to use the Apache API for this step which
++     * is aware of HTTP chunking. So the trick is to suck in the pending request
++     * data via the Apache API (which uses Apache's BUFF code and in the
++     * background mod_ssl's I/O glue code) and re-inject it later into the Apache
++     * BUFF code again. This way the data flows twice through the Apache BUFF, of
++     * course. But this way the solution doesn't depend on any Apache specifics
++     * and is fully transparent to Apache modules.
++     *
++     * !! BUT ALL THIS IS STILL NOT RE-IMPLEMENTED FOR APACHE 2.0 !!
++     */
++    if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick && (r->method_number == M_POST)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                     "SSL Re-negotiation in conjunction "
++                     "with POST method not supported!\n"
++                     "hint: try SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate");
++
++        return HTTP_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * now do the renegotiation if anything was actually reconfigured
++     */
++    if (renegotiate) {
++        /*
++         * Now we force the SSL renegotation by sending the Hello Request
++         * message to the client. Here we have to do a workaround: Actually
++         * OpenSSL returns immediately after sending the Hello Request (the
++         * intent AFAIK is because the SSL/TLS protocol says it's not a must
++         * that the client replies to a Hello Request). But because we insist
++         * on a reply (anything else is an error for us) we have to go to the
++         * ACCEPT state manually. Using SSL_set_accept_state() doesn't work
++         * here because it resets too much of the connection.  So we set the
++         * state explicitly and continue the handshake manually.
++         */
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                     "Requesting connection re-negotiation");
++
++        if (renegotiate_quick) {
++            STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack;
++
++            /* perform just a manual re-verification of the peer */
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Performing quick renegotiation: "
++                         "just re-verifying the peer");
++
++            cert_stack = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl);
++
++            cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
++
++            if (!cert_stack && cert) {
++                /* client cert is in the session cache, but there is
++                 * no chain, since ssl3_get_client_certificate()
++                 * sk_X509_shift-ed the peer cert out of the chain.
++                 * we put it back here for the purpose of quick_renegotiation.
++                 */
++                cert_stack = sk_new_null();
++                sk_X509_push(cert_stack, MODSSL_PCHAR_CAST cert);
++            }
++
++            if (!cert_stack || (sk_X509_num(cert_stack) == 0)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Cannot find peer certificate chain");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (!(cert_store ||
++                  (cert_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))))
++            {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Cannot find certificate storage");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (!cert) {
++                cert = sk_X509_value(cert_stack, 0);
++            }
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_store_ctx, cert_store, cert, cert_stack);
++            depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(ssl);
++
++            if (depth >= 0) {
++                X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&cert_store_ctx, depth);
++            }
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&cert_store_ctx,
++                                       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),
++                                       (char *)ssl);
++
++            if (!modssl_X509_verify_cert(&cert_store_ctx)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation verification step failed");
++                ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++            }
++
++            SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, cert_store_ctx.error);
++            X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_store_ctx);
++
++            if (cert_stack != SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl)) {
++                /* we created this ourselves, so free it */
++                sk_X509_pop_free(cert_stack, X509_free);
++            }
++        }
++        else {
++            request_rec *id = r->main ? r->main : r;
++
++            /* do a full renegotiation */
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Performing full renegotiation: "
++                         "complete handshake protocol");
++
++            SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl,
++                                       (unsigned char *)&id,
++                                       sizeof(id));
++
++            SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
++            SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
++
++            if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation request failed");
++
++                r->connection->aborted = 1;
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Awaiting re-negotiation handshake");
++
++            SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL_ST_ACCEPT);
++            SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
++
++            if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                        "Not accepted by client!?");
++
++                r->connection->aborted = 1;
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Remember the peer certificate's DN
++         */
++        if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))) {
++            if (sslconn->client_cert) {
++                X509_free(sslconn->client_cert);
++            }
++            sslconn->client_cert = cert;
++            sslconn->client_dn = NULL;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results
++         */
++        if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) {
++            BOOL do_verify = (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE);
++
++            if (do_verify && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                             "Client verification failed");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (do_verify) {
++                if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) == NULL) {
++                    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                                 "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                                 "Client certificate missing");
++
++                    return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++                }
++
++                X509_free(peercert);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check SSLRequire boolean expressions
++     */
++    requires = dc->aRequirement;
++    ssl_requires = (ssl_require_t *)requires->elts;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < requires->nelts; i++) {
++        ssl_require_t *req = &ssl_requires[i];
++        ok = ssl_expr_exec(r, req->mpExpr);
++
++        if (ok < 0) {
++            cp = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
++                              "Failed to execute "
++                              "SSL requirement expression: %s",
++                              ssl_expr_get_error());
++
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                          "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                          r->filename, cp);
++
++            /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++            apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        if (ok != 1) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Access to %s denied for %s "
++                         "(requirement expression not fulfilled)",
++                         r->filename, r->connection->remote_ip);
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Failed expression: %s", req->cpExpr);
++
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                          "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                          r->filename,
++                          "SSL requirement expression not fulfilled "
++                          "(see SSL logfile for more details)");
++
++            /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++            apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Else access is granted from our point of view (except vendor
++     * handlers override). But we have to return DECLINED here instead
++     * of OK, because mod_auth and other modules still might want to
++     * deny access.
++     */
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  Authentication Handler:
++ *  Fake a Basic authentication from the X509 client certificate.
++ *
++ *  This must be run fairly early on to prevent a real authentication from
++ *  occuring, in particular it must be run before anything else that
++ *  authenticates a user.  This means that the Module statement for this
++ *  module should be LAST in the Configuration file.
++ */
++int ssl_hook_UserCheck(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    char buf1[MAX_STRING_LEN], buf2[MAX_STRING_LEN];
++    char *clientdn;
++    const char *auth_line, *username, *password;
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally forbid access (again)
++     * when strict require option is used.
++     */
++    if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) &&
++        (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden")))
++    {
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * We decline when we are in a subrequest.  The Authorization header
++     * would already be present if it was added in the main request.
++     */
++    if (!ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Make sure the user is not able to fake the client certificate
++     * based authentication by just entering an X.509 Subject DN
++     * ("/XX=YYY/XX=YYY/..") as the username and "password" as the
++     * password.
++     */
++    if ((auth_line = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Authorization"))) {
++        if (strcEQ(ap_getword(r->pool, &auth_line, ' '), "Basic")) {
++            while ((*auth_line == ' ') || (*auth_line == '\t')) {
++                auth_line++;
++            }
++
++            auth_line = ap_pbase64decode(r->pool, auth_line);
++            username = ap_getword_nulls(r->pool, &auth_line, ':');
++            password = auth_line;
++
++            if ((username[0] == '/') && strEQ(password, "password")) {
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
++                    "Encountered FakeBasicAuth spoof: %s", username);
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * We decline operation in various situations...
++     * - SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth not configured
++     * - r->user already authenticated
++     * - ssl not enabled
++     * - client did not present a certificate
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled && sslconn->ssl && sslconn->client_cert) ||
++        !(dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) || r->user)
++    {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++    
++    if (!sslconn->client_dn) {
++        X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(sslconn->client_cert);
++        char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0);
++        sslconn->client_dn = apr_pstrdup(r->connection->pool, cp);
++        modssl_free(cp);
++    }
++
++    clientdn = (char *)sslconn->client_dn;
++
++    /*
++     * Fake a password - which one would be immaterial, as, it seems, an empty
++     * password in the users file would match ALL incoming passwords, if only
++     * we were using the standard crypt library routine. Unfortunately, OpenSSL
++     * "fixes" a "bug" in crypt and thus prevents blank passwords from
++     * working.  (IMHO what they really fix is a bug in the users of the code
++     * - failing to program correctly for shadow passwords).  We need,
++     * therefore, to provide a password. This password can be matched by
++     * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file.
++     * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-)
++     */
++    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%s:password", clientdn);
++    ssl_util_uuencode(buf2, buf1, FALSE);
++
++    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "Basic %s", buf2);
++    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", buf1);
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", buf1);
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/* authorization phase */
++int ssl_hook_Auth(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally forbid access (again)
++     * when strict require option is used.
++     */
++    if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) &&
++        (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden")))
++    {
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *   Fixup Handler
++ */
++
++static const char *ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[] = {
++    "SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE",
++    "SSL_VERSION_LIBRARY",
++    "SSL_PROTOCOL",
++    "SSL_CIPHER",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_M_VERSION",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_M_SERIAL",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_V_START",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_V_END",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_C",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_L",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_T",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_I",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_G",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_S",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_D",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_C",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_L",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_O",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_T",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_I",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_G",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_S",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_D",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_A_KEY",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_A_SIG",
++    "SSL_SERVER_M_VERSION",
++    "SSL_SERVER_M_SERIAL",
++    "SSL_SERVER_V_START",
++    "SSL_SERVER_V_END",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_C",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_L",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_O",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_T",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_I",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_G",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_S",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_D",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_C",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_L",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_O",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_T",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_I",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_G",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_S",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_D",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_SERVER_A_KEY",
++    "SSL_SERVER_A_SIG",
++    "SSL_SESSION_ID",
++    NULL
++};
++
++int ssl_hook_Fixup(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    apr_table_t *env = r->subprocess_env;
++    char *var, *val = "";
++    STACK_OF(X509) *peer_certs;
++    SSL *ssl;
++    int i;
++
++    /*
++     * Check to see if SSL is on
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled && sslconn && (ssl = sslconn->ssl))) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Annotate the SSI/CGI environment with standard SSL information
++     */
++    /* the always present HTTPS (=HTTP over SSL) flag! */
++    apr_table_setn(env, "HTTPS", "on"); 
++
++    /* standard SSL environment variables */
++    if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STDENVVARS) {
++        for (i = 0; ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; i++) {
++            var = (char *)ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i];
++            val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, r, var);
++            if (!strIsEmpty(val)) {
++                apr_table_setn(env, var, val);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * On-demand bloat up the SSI/CGI environment with certificate data
++     */
++    if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_EXPORTCERTDATA) {
++        val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                             r, "SSL_SERVER_CERT");
++
++        apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_SERVER_CERT", val);
++
++        val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                             r, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT");
++
++        apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT", val);
++
++        if ((peer_certs = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) {
++            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(peer_certs); i++) {
++                var = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT_CHAIN_%d", i);
++                val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                                     r, var);
++                if (val) {
++                    apr_table_setn(env, var, val);
++                }
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*  _________________________________________________________________
++**
++**  OpenSSL Callback Functions
++**  _________________________________________________________________
++*/
++
++/*
++ * Handle out temporary RSA private keys on demand
++ *
++ * The background of this as the TLSv1 standard explains it:
++ *
++ * | D.1. Temporary RSA keys
++ * |
++ * |    US Export restrictions limit RSA keys used for encryption to 512
++ * |    bits, but do not place any limit on lengths of RSA keys used for
++ * |    signing operations. Certificates often need to be larger than 512
++ * |    bits, since 512-bit RSA keys are not secure enough for high-value
++ * |    transactions or for applications requiring long-term security. Some
++ * |    certificates are also designated signing-only, in which case they
++ * |    cannot be used for key exchange.
++ * |
++ * |    When the public key in the certificate cannot be used for encryption,
++ * |    the server signs a temporary RSA key, which is then exchanged. In
++ * |    exportable applications, the temporary RSA key should be the maximum
++ * |    allowable length (i.e., 512 bits). Because 512-bit RSA keys are
++ * |    relatively insecure, they should be changed often. For typical
++ * |    electronic commerce applications, it is suggested that keys be
++ * |    changed daily or every 500 transactions, and more often if possible.
++ * |    Note that while it is acceptable to use the same temporary key for
++ * |    multiple transactions, it must be signed each time it is used.
++ * |
++ * |    RSA key generation is a time-consuming process. In many cases, a
++ * |    low-priority process can be assigned the task of key generation.
++ * |    Whenever a new key is completed, the existing temporary key can be
++ * |    replaced with the new one.
++ *
++ * XXX: base on comment above, if thread support is enabled,
++ * we should spawn a low-priority thread to generate new keys
++ * on the fly.
++ *
++ * So we generated 512 and 1024 bit temporary keys on startup
++ * which we now just hand out on demand....
++ */
++
++RSA *ssl_callback_TmpRSA(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
++    int idx;
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c->base_server,
++                 "handing out temporary %d bit RSA key", keylen);
++
++    /* doesn't matter if export flag is on,
++     * we won't be asked for keylen > 512 in that case.
++     * if we are asked for a keylen > 1024, it is too expensive
++     * to generate on the fly.
++     * XXX: any reason not to generate 2048 bit keys at startup?
++     */
++
++    switch (keylen) {
++      case 512:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_512;
++        break;
++
++      case 1024:
++      default:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_1024;
++    }
++
++    return (RSA *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx];
++}
++
++/* 
++ * Hand out the already generated DH parameters...
++ */
++DH *ssl_callback_TmpDH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
++    int idx;
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c->base_server,
++                 "handing out temporary %d bit DH key", keylen);
++
++    switch (keylen) {
++      case 512:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_512;
++        break;
++
++      case 1024:
++      default:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024;
++    }
++
++    return (DH *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx];
++}
++
++/*
++ * This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL
++ * does client authentication and verifies the certificate chain.
++ */
++int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    SSL *ssl            = (SSL *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
++    conn_rec *conn      = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s       = conn->base_server;
++    request_rec *r      = (request_rec *)SSL_get_app_data2(ssl);
++
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = r ? myDirConfig(r) : NULL;
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(conn);
++    modssl_ctx_t *mctx  = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
++
++    /* Get verify ingredients */
++    int errnum   = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
++    int errdepth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
++    int depth, verify;
++
++    /*
++     * Log verification information
++     */
++    if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        X509 *cert  = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
++        char *sname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0);
++        char *iname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert),  NULL, 0);
++
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: "
++                     "depth: %d, subject: %s, issuer: %s",
++                     errdepth,
++                     sname ? sname : "-unknown-",
++                     iname ? iname : "-unknown-");
++
++        if (sname) {
++            modssl_free(sname);
++        }
++
++        if (iname) {
++            modssl_free(iname);
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check for optionally acceptable non-verifiable issuer situation
++     */
++    if (dc && (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) {
++        verify = dc->nVerifyClient;
++    }
++    else {
++        verify = mctx->auth.verify_mode;
++    }
++
++    if (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) {
++        /* 
++         * SSLProxyVerify is either not configured or set to "none".
++         * (this callback doesn't happen in the server context if SSLVerify
++         *  is not configured or set to "none")
++         */
++        return TRUE;
++    }
++
++    if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(errnum) &&
++        (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
++    {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Verifiable Issuer is "
++                     "configured as optional, therefore we're accepting "
++                     "the certificate");
++
++        sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS";
++        ok = TRUE;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally perform CRL-based revocation checks
++     */
++    if (ok) {
++        if (!(ok = ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(ok, ctx, conn))) {
++            errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason
++     */
++    if (!ok) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s",
++                     errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum));
++
++        if (sslconn->client_cert) {
++            X509_free(sslconn->client_cert);
++            sslconn->client_cert = NULL;
++        }
++        sslconn->client_dn = NULL;
++        sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Finally check the depth of the certificate verification
++     */
++    if (dc && (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET)) {
++        depth = dc->nVerifyDepth;
++    }
++    else {
++        depth = mctx->auth.verify_depth;
++    }
++
++    if (errdepth > depth) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long "
++                     "(chain has %d certificates, but maximum allowed are "
++                     "only %d)",
++                     errdepth, depth);
++
++        errnum = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
++        sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum);
++
++        ok = FALSE;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * And finally signal OpenSSL the (perhaps changed) state
++     */
++    return ok;
++}
++
++int ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, conn_rec *c)
++{
++    server_rec *s       = c->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c);
++    modssl_ctx_t *mctx  = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
++    X509_OBJECT obj;
++    X509_NAME *subject, *issuer;
++    X509 *cert;
++    X509_CRL *crl;
++    EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
++    int i, n, rc;
++
++    /*
++     * Unless a revocation store for CRLs was created we
++     * cannot do any CRL-based verification, of course.
++     */
++    if (!mctx->crl) {
++        return ok;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Determine certificate ingredients in advance
++     */
++    cert    = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
++    subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
++    issuer  = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
++
++    /*
++     * OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does not
++     * use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it
++     * explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked
++     * certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store.
++     *
++     * We come through this procedure for each certificate in the certificate
++     * chain, starting with the root-CA's certificate. At each step we've to
++     * both verify the signature on the CRL (to make sure it's a valid CRL)
++     * and it's revocation list (to make sure the current certificate isn't
++     * revoked).  But because to check the signature on the CRL we need the
++     * public key of the issuing CA certificate (which was already processed
++     * one round before), we've a little problem. But we can both solve it and
++     * at the same time optimize the processing by using the following
++     * verification scheme (idea and code snippets borrowed from the GLOBUS
++     * project):
++     *
++     * 1. We'll check the signature of a CRL in each step when we find a CRL
++     *    through the _subject_ name of the current certificate. This CRL
++     *    itself will be needed the first time in the next round, of course.
++     *    But we do the signature processing one round before this where the
++     *    public key of the CA is available.
++     *
++     * 2. We'll check the revocation list of a CRL in each step when
++     *    we find a CRL through the _issuer_ name of the current certificate.
++     *    This CRLs signature was then already verified one round before.
++     *
++     * This verification scheme allows a CA to revoke its own certificate as
++     * well, of course.
++     */
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
++     * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity.
++     */
++    memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
++    rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl,
++                               X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
++    crl = obj.data.crl;
++
++    if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
++        /*
++         * Log information about CRL
++         * (A little bit complicated because of ASN.1 and BIOs...)
++         */
++        if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++            char buff[512]; /* should be plenty */
++            BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, "CA CRL: Issuer: ");
++            X509_NAME_print(bio, issuer, 0);
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, ", lastUpdate: ");
++            ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl));
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, ", nextUpdate: ");
++            ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
++
++            n = BIO_read(bio, buff, sizeof(buff));
++            buff[n] = '\0';
++
++            BIO_free(bio);
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, buff);
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Verify the signature on this CRL
++         */
++        pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
++        rc = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pubkey);
++#ifdef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
++        /* Only refcounted in OpenSSL */
++        if (pubkey)
++            EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
++#endif
++        if (rc <= 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Invalid signature on CRL");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Check date of CRL to make sure it's not expired
++         */
++        i = X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
++
++        if (i == 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,
++                                     X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        if (i < 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Found CRL is expired - "
++                         "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
++     * the current certificate in order to check for revocation.
++     */
++    memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
++    rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl,
++                               X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
++
++    crl = obj.data.crl;
++    if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
++        /*
++         * Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL
++         */
++        n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
++
++        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
++            X509_REVOKED *revoked =
++                sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
++
++            ASN1_INTEGER *sn = X509_REVOKED_get_serialNumber(revoked);
++
++            if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) {
++                if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++                    char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0);
++                    long serial = ASN1_INTEGER_get(sn);
++
++                    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s,
++                                 "Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) "
++                                 "revoked per CRL from issuer %s",
++                                 serial, serial, cp);
++                    modssl_free(cp);
++                }
++
++                X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
++                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++                return FALSE;
++            }
++        }
++
++        X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++    }
++
++    return ok;
++}
++
++#define SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT \
++   "Proxy client certificate callback: (%s) "
++
++static void modssl_proxy_info_log(server_rec *s,
++                                  X509_INFO *info,
++                                  const char *msg)
++{
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    char name_buf[256];
++    X509_NAME *name;
++    char *dn;
++
++    if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    name = X509_get_subject_name(info->x509);
++    dn = X509_NAME_oneline(name, name_buf, sizeof(name_buf));
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "%s, sending %s", 
++                 sc->vhost_id, msg, dn ? dn : "-uknown-");
++}
++
++/*
++ * caller will decrement the cert and key reference
++ * so we need to increment here to prevent them from
++ * being freed.
++ */
++#define modssl_set_cert_info(info, cert, pkey) \
++    *cert = info->x509; \
++    X509_reference_inc(*cert); \
++    *pkey = info->x_pkey->dec_pkey; \
++    EVP_PKEY_reference_inc(*pkey)
++
++int ssl_callback_proxy_cert(SSL *ssl, MODSSL_CLIENT_CERT_CB_ARG_TYPE **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s = c->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    X509_NAME *ca_name, *issuer;
++    X509_INFO *info;
++    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list;
++    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *certs = sc->proxy->pkp->certs;
++    int i, j;
++    
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, 
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "entered",
++                 sc->vhost_id);
++
++    if (!certs || (sk_X509_INFO_num(certs) <= 0)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                     SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT
++                     "downstream server wanted client certificate "
++                     "but none are configured", sc->vhost_id);
++        return FALSE;
++    }                                                                     
++
++    ca_list = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
++
++    if (!ca_list || (sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list) <= 0)) {
++        /* 
++         * downstream server didn't send us a list of acceptable CA certs, 
++         * so we send the first client cert in the list.
++         */   
++        info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, 0);
++        
++        modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "no acceptable CA list");
++
++        modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey);
++
++        return TRUE;
++    }         
++
++    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list); i++) {
++        ca_name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_list, i);
++
++        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_INFO_num(certs); j++) {
++            info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, j);
++            issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(info->x509);
++
++            if (X509_NAME_cmp(issuer, ca_name) == 0) {
++                modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "found acceptable cert");
++
++                modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey);
++
++                return TRUE;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT
++                 "no client certificate found!?", sc->vhost_id);
++
++    return FALSE; 
++}
++
++static void ssl_session_log(server_rec *s,
++                            const char *request,
++                            unsigned char *id,
++                            unsigned int idlen,
++                            const char *status,
++                            const char *result,
++                            long timeout)
++{
++    char buf[SSL_SESSION_ID_STRING_LEN];
++    char timeout_str[56] = {'\0'};
++
++    if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    if (timeout) {
++        apr_snprintf(timeout_str, sizeof(timeout_str),
++                     "timeout=%lds ", (timeout - time(NULL)));
++    }
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 "Inter-Process Session Cache: "
++                 "request=%s status=%s id=%s %s(session %s)",
++                 request, status,
++                 SSL_SESSION_id2sz(id, idlen, buf, sizeof(buf)),
++                 timeout_str, result);
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a new SSL_SESSION is
++ *  added to the internal OpenSSL session cache. We use this hook to spread the
++ *  SSL_SESSION also to the inter-process disk-cache to make share it with our
++ *  other Apache pre-forked server processes.
++ */
++int ssl_callback_NewSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    conn_rec *conn      = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s       = conn->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    long timeout        = sc->session_cache_timeout;
++    BOOL rc;
++    unsigned char *id;
++    unsigned int idlen;
++
++    /*
++     * Set the timeout also for the internal OpenSSL cache, because this way
++     * our inter-process cache is consulted only when it's really necessary.
++     */
++    SSL_set_timeout(session, timeout);
++
++    /*
++     * Store the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process cache with the
++     * same expire time, so it expires automatically there, too.
++     */
++    id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session);
++    idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session);
++
++    timeout += modssl_session_get_time(session);
++
++    rc = ssl_scache_store(s, id, idlen, timeout, session);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "SET", id, idlen,
++                    rc == TRUE ? "OK" : "BAD",
++                    "caching", timeout);
++
++    /*
++     * return 0 which means to OpenSSL that the session is still
++     * valid and was not freed by us with SSL_SESSION_free().
++     */
++    return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a
++ *  SSL_SESSION is looked up in the internal OpenSSL cache and it
++ *  was not found. We use this to lookup the SSL_SESSION in the
++ *  inter-process disk-cache where it was perhaps stored by one
++ *  of our other Apache pre-forked server processes.
++ */
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_callback_GetSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl,
++                                               unsigned char *id,
++                                               int idlen, int *do_copy)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s  = conn->base_server;
++    SSL_SESSION *session;
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
++     */
++    session = ssl_scache_retrieve(s, id, idlen);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "GET", id, idlen,
++                    session ? "FOUND" : "MISSED",
++                    session ? "reuse" : "renewal", 0);
++
++    /*
++     * Return NULL or the retrieved SSL_SESSION. But indicate (by
++     * setting do_copy to 0) that the reference count on the
++     * SSL_SESSION should not be incremented by the SSL library,
++     * because we will no longer hold a reference to it ourself.
++     */
++    *do_copy = 0;
++
++    return session;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a
++ *  SSL_SESSION is removed from the the internal OpenSSL cache.
++ *  We use this to remove the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process
++ *  disk-cache, too.
++ */
++void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx,
++                                       SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++    server_rec *s;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
++    unsigned char *id;
++    unsigned int idlen;
++
++    /*
++     * Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context
++     */
++    if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) {
++        return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */
++    }
++
++    sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++
++    /*
++     * Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
++     */
++    id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session);
++    idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session);
++
++    ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen,
++                    "OK", "dead", 0);
++
++    return;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This callback function is executed while OpenSSL processes the
++ * SSL handshake and does SSL record layer stuff. We use it to
++ * trace OpenSSL's processing in out SSL logfile.
++ */
++void ssl_callback_LogTracingState(MODSSL_INFO_CB_ARG_TYPE ssl, int where, int rc)
++{
++    conn_rec *c;
++    server_rec *s;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
++
++    /*
++     * find corresponding server
++     */
++    if (!(c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data((SSL *)ssl))) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    s = c->base_server;
++    if (!(sc = mySrvConfig(s))) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * create the various trace messages
++     */
++    if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Handshake: start", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Handshake: done", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Loop: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_READ) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Read: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Write: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
++            char *str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Alert: %s:%s:%s\n",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, str,
++                         SSL_alert_type_string_long(rc),
++                         SSL_alert_desc_string_long(rc));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
++            if (rc == 0) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                             "%s: Exit: failed in %s",
++                             SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++            }
++            else if (rc < 0) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                             "%s: Exit: error in %s",
++                             SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Because SSL renegotations can happen at any time (not only after
++     * SSL_accept()), the best way to log the current connection details is
++     * right after a finished handshake.
++     */
++    if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s,
++                     "Connection: Client IP: %s, Protocol: %s, "
++                     "Cipher: %s (%s/%s bits)",
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "REMOTE_ADDR"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_PROTOCOL"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE"));
++    }
++}
++
diff --git a/net-www/apache/files/patches/2.0.49-r2/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch b/net-www/apache/files/patches/2.0.49-r2/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4caf45f2041f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-www/apache/files/patches/2.0.49-r2/01_ssl_engine_kernel.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,1842 @@
+diff -Naur httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
+--- httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c	2004-02-09 20:53:20.000000000 +0000
++++ httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c	2004-05-29 09:39:18.605535640 +0000
+@@ -793,7 +793,6 @@
+     SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
+     SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
+     SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
+-    char buf1[MAX_STRING_LEN], buf2[MAX_STRING_LEN];
+     char *clientdn;
+     const char *auth_line, *username, *password;
+ 
+@@ -872,14 +871,16 @@
+      * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file.
+      * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-)
+      */
+-    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%s:password", clientdn);
+-    ssl_util_uuencode(buf2, buf1, FALSE);
+-
+-    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "Basic %s", buf2);
+-    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", buf1);
++    auth_line = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "Basic ", 
++                            ap_pbase64encode(r->pool, 
++                                             apr_pstrcat(r->pool, clientdn, 
++                                                         ":password", NULL)),
++                            NULL);
++    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", auth_line);
+ 
+     ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
+-                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", buf1);
++                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"",
++                 auth_line);
+ 
+     return DECLINED;
+ }
+diff -Naur httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig
+--- httpd-2.0.49/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ httpd-2.0.49-gentoo/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c.orig	2004-02-09 20:53:20.000000000 +0000
+@@ -0,0 +1,1804 @@
++/* Copyright 2001-2004 The Apache Software Foundation
++ *
++ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
++ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
++ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
++ *
++ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
++ *
++ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
++ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
++ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
++ * limitations under the License.
++ */
++
++/*                      _             _
++ *  _ __ ___   ___   __| |    ___ ___| |  mod_ssl
++ * | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` |   / __/ __| |  Apache Interface to OpenSSL
++ * | | | | | | (_) | (_| |   \__ \__ \ |
++ * |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_|
++ *                      |_____|
++ *  ssl_engine_kernel.c
++ *  The SSL engine kernel
++ */
++                             /* ``It took me fifteen years to discover
++                                  I had no talent for programming, but
++                                  I couldn't give it up because by that
++                                  time I was too famous.''
++                                            -- Unknown                */
++#include "mod_ssl.h"
++
++/*
++ *  Post Read Request Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSL *ssl;
++
++    if (!sslconn) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    if (sslconn->non_ssl_request) {
++        const char *errmsg;
++        char *thisurl;
++        char *thisport = "";
++        int port = ap_get_server_port(r);
++
++        if (!ap_is_default_port(port, r)) {
++            thisport = apr_psprintf(r->pool, ":%u", port);
++        }
++
++        thisurl = ap_escape_html(r->pool,
++                                 apr_psprintf(r->pool, "https://%s%s/",
++                                              ap_get_server_name(r),
++                                              thisport));
++
++        errmsg = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
++                              "Reason: You're speaking plain HTTP "
++                              "to an SSL-enabled server port.<br />\n"
++                              "Instead use the HTTPS scheme to access "
++                              "this URL, please.<br />\n"
++                              "<blockquote>Hint: "
++                              "<a href=\"%s\"><b>%s</b></a></blockquote>",
++                              thisurl, thisurl);
++
++        apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", errmsg);
++
++        /* Now that we have caught this error, forget it. we are done
++         * with using SSL on this request.
++         */
++        sslconn->non_ssl_request = 0;
++        
++
++        return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Get the SSL connection structure and perform the
++     * delayed interlinking from SSL back to request_rec
++     */
++    if ((ssl = sslconn->ssl)) {
++        SSL_set_app_data2(ssl, r);
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Move SetEnvIf information from request_rec to conn_rec/BUFF
++ * to allow the close connection handler to use them.
++ */
++
++static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn)
++{
++    int i;
++    const apr_array_header_t *arr = apr_table_elts(r->subprocess_env);
++    const apr_table_entry_t *elts = (const apr_table_entry_t *)arr->elts;
++
++    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_STANDARD;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < arr->nelts; i++) {
++        const char *key = elts[i].key;
++
++        switch (*key) {
++          case 's':
++            /* being case-sensitive here.
++             * and not checking for the -shutdown since these are the only
++             * SetEnvIf "flags" we support
++             */
++            if (!strncmp(key+1, "sl-", 3)) {
++                key += 4;
++                if (!strncmp(key, "unclean", 7)) {
++                    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNCLEAN;
++                }
++                else if (!strncmp(key, "accurate", 8)) {
++                    sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_ACCURATE;
++                }
++                return; /* should only ever be one ssl-*-shutdown */
++            }
++            break;
++        }
++    }
++}
++
++/*
++ *  URL Translation Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_Translate(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++
++    if (!(sslconn && sslconn->ssl)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Log information about incoming HTTPS requests
++     */
++    if (r->server->loglevel >= APLOG_INFO && ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                     "%s HTTPS request received for child %ld (server %s)",
++                     (r->connection->keepalives <= 0 ?
++                     "Initial (No.1)" :
++                     apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Subsequent (No.%d)",
++                                  r->connection->keepalives+1)),
++                     r->connection->id,
++                     ssl_util_vhostid(r->pool, r->server));
++    }
++
++    /* SetEnvIf ssl-*-shutdown flags can only be per-server,
++     * so they won't change across keepalive requests
++     */
++    if (sslconn->shutdown_type == SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNSET) {
++        ssl_configure_env(r, sslconn);
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  Access Handler
++ */
++int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSL *ssl            = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL;
++    SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    apr_array_header_t *requires;
++    ssl_require_t *ssl_requires;
++    char *cp;
++    int ok, i;
++    BOOL renegotiate = FALSE, renegotiate_quick = FALSE;
++    X509 *cert;
++    X509 *peercert;
++    X509_STORE *cert_store = NULL;
++    X509_STORE_CTX cert_store_ctx;
++    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_old = NULL, *cipher_list = NULL;
++    SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
++    int depth, verify_old, verify, n;
++
++    if (ssl) {
++        ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Support for SSLRequireSSL directive
++     */
++    if (dc->bSSLRequired && !ssl) {
++        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                      "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                      r->filename, "SSL connection required");
++
++        /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++        apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check to see if SSL protocol is on
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled || ssl)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++    /*
++     * Support for per-directory reconfigured SSL connection parameters.
++     *
++     * This is implemented by forcing an SSL renegotiation with the
++     * reconfigured parameter suite. But Apache's internal API processing
++     * makes our life very hard here, because when internal sub-requests occur
++     * we nevertheless should avoid multiple unnecessary SSL handshakes (they
++     * require extra network I/O and especially time to perform). 
++     * 
++     * But the optimization for filtering out the unnecessary handshakes isn't
++     * obvious and trivial.  Especially because while Apache is in its
++     * sub-request processing the client could force additional handshakes,
++     * too. And these take place perhaps without our notice. So the only
++     * possibility is to explicitly _ask_ OpenSSL whether the renegotiation
++     * has to be performed or not. It has to performed when some parameters
++     * which were previously known (by us) are not those we've now
++     * reconfigured (as known by OpenSSL) or (in optimized way) at least when
++     * the reconfigured parameter suite is stronger (more restrictions) than
++     * the currently active one.
++     */
++
++    /*
++     * Override of SSLCipherSuite
++     *
++     * We provide two options here:
++     *
++     * o The paranoid and default approach where we force a renegotiation when
++     *   the cipher suite changed in _any_ way (which is straight-forward but
++     *   often forces renegotiations too often and is perhaps not what the
++     *   user actually wanted).
++     *
++     * o The optimized and still secure way where we force a renegotiation
++     *   only if the currently active cipher is no longer contained in the
++     *   reconfigured/new cipher suite. Any other changes are not important
++     *   because it's the servers choice to select a cipher from the ones the
++     *   client supports. So as long as the current cipher is still in the new
++     *   cipher suite we're happy. Because we can assume we would have
++     *   selected it again even when other (better) ciphers exists now in the
++     *   new cipher suite. This approach is fine because the user explicitly
++     *   has to enable this via ``SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate''. So we do no
++     *   implicit optimizations.
++     */
++    if (dc->szCipherSuite) {
++        /* remember old state */
++
++        if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) {
++            cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
++        }
++        else {
++            cipher_list_old = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
++
++            if (cipher_list_old) {
++                cipher_list_old = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list_old);
++            }
++        }
++
++        /* configure new state */
++        if (!modssl_set_cipher_list(ssl, dc->szCipherSuite)) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0,
++                         r->server,
++                         "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) "
++                         "permitted SSL ciphers");
++            ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++
++            if (cipher_list_old) {
++                sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old);
++            }
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */
++        cipher_list = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
++
++        if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) {
++            /* optimized way */
++            if ((!cipher && cipher_list) ||
++                (cipher && !cipher_list))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++            else if (cipher && cipher_list &&
++                     (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, cipher) < 0))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++        }
++        else {
++            /* paranoid way */
++            if ((!cipher_list_old && cipher_list) ||
++                (cipher_list_old && !cipher_list))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++            }
++            else if (cipher_list_old && cipher_list) {
++                for (n = 0;
++                     !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list));
++                     n++)
++                {
++                    SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list, n);
++
++                    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list_old, value) < 0) {
++                        renegotiate = TRUE;
++                    }
++                }
++
++                for (n = 0;
++                     !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list_old));
++                     n++)
++                {
++                    SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list_old, n);
++
++                    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, value) < 0) {
++                        renegotiate = TRUE;
++                    }
++                }
++            }
++        }
++
++        /* cleanup */
++        if (cipher_list_old) {
++            sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old);
++        }
++
++        /* tracing */
++        if (renegotiate) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Reconfigured cipher suite will force renegotiation");
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override of SSLVerifyDepth
++     *
++     * The depth checks are handled by us manually inside the verify callback
++     * function and not by OpenSSL internally (and our function is aware of
++     * both the per-server and per-directory contexts). So we cannot ask
++     * OpenSSL about the currently verify depth. Instead we remember it in our
++     * ap_ctx attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL.  We've to force the
++     * renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify depth is less than the
++     * currently active/remembered verify depth (because this means more
++     * restriction on the certificate chain).
++     */
++    if (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) {
++        /* XXX: doesnt look like sslconn->verify_depth is actually used */
++        if (!(n = sslconn->verify_depth)) {
++            sslconn->verify_depth = n = sc->server->auth.verify_depth;
++        }
++
++        /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */
++        if (dc->nVerifyDepth < n) {
++            renegotiate = TRUE;
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Reduced client verification depth will force "
++                         "renegotiation");
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override of SSLVerifyClient
++     *
++     * We force a renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify type is
++     * stronger than the currently active verify type. 
++     *
++     * The order is: none << optional_no_ca << optional << require
++     *
++     * Additionally the following optimization is possible here: When the
++     * currently active verify type is "none" but a client certificate is
++     * already known/present, it's enough to manually force a client
++     * verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotation
++     * handshake.
++     */
++    if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) {
++        /* remember old state */
++        verify_old = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl);
++        /* configure new state */
++        verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
++
++        if (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) {
++            verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT;
++        }
++
++        if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) ||
++            (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
++        {
++            verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
++        }
++
++        modssl_set_verify(ssl, verify, ssl_callback_SSLVerify);
++        SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
++
++        /* determine whether we've to force a renegotiation */
++        if (!renegotiate && verify != verify_old) {
++            if (((verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) &&
++                 (verify     != SSL_VERIFY_NONE)) ||
++
++                (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
++                  (verify     & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) ||
++
++                (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT) &&
++                  (verify     & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT)))
++            {
++                renegotiate = TRUE;
++                /* optimization */
++
++                if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) &&
++                    (verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) &&
++                    ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) != NULL))
++                {
++                    renegotiate_quick = TRUE;
++                    X509_free(peercert);
++                }
++
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0,
++                             r->server,
++                             "Changed client verification type will force "
++                             "%srenegotiation",
++                             renegotiate_quick ? "quick " : "");
++             }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * override SSLCACertificateFile & SSLCACertificatePath
++     * This is only enabled if the SSL_set_cert_store() function
++     * is available in the ssl library.  the 1.x based mod_ssl
++     * used SSL_CTX_set_cert_store which is not thread safe.
++     */
++
++#ifdef HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE
++    /*
++     * check if per-dir and per-server config field are not the same.
++     * if f is defined in per-dir and not defined in per-server
++     * or f is defined in both but not the equal ...
++     */
++#define MODSSL_CFG_NE(f) \
++     (dc->f && (!sc->f || (sc->f && strNE(dc->f, sc->f))))
++
++#define MODSSL_CFG_CA(f) \
++     (dc->f ? dc->f : sc->f)
++
++    if (MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificateFile) ||
++        MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificatePath))
++    {
++        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list;
++        const char *ca_file = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificateFile);
++        const char *ca_path = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificatePath);
++
++        cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
++
++        if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(cert_store, ca_file, ca_path)) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                         "Unable to reconfigure verify locations "
++                         "for client authentication");
++            ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++
++            X509_STORE_free(cert_store);
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        /* SSL_free will free cert_store */
++        SSL_set_cert_store(ssl, cert_store);
++
++        if (!(ca_list = ssl_init_FindCAList(r->server, r->pool,
++                                            ca_file, ca_path)))
++        {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                         "Unable to determine list of available "
++                         "CA certificates for client authentication");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, ca_list);
++        renegotiate = TRUE;
++
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                     "Changed client verification locations will force "
++                     "renegotiation");
++    }
++#endif /* HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE */
++
++    /* 
++     * SSL renegotiations in conjunction with HTTP
++     * requests using the POST method are not supported.
++     *
++     * Background:
++     *
++     * 1. When the client sends a HTTP/HTTPS request, Apache's core code
++     * reads only the request line ("METHOD /path HTTP/x.y") and the
++     * attached MIME headers ("Foo: bar") up to the terminating line ("CR
++     * LF"). An attached request body (for instance the data of a POST
++     * method) is _NOT_ read. Instead it is read by mod_cgi's content
++     * handler and directly passed to the CGI script.
++     *
++     * 2. mod_ssl supports per-directory re-configuration of SSL parameters.
++     * This is implemented by performing an SSL renegotiation of the
++     * re-configured parameters after the request is read, but before the
++     * response is sent. In more detail: the renegotiation happens after the
++     * request line and MIME headers were read, but _before_ the attached
++     * request body is read. The reason simply is that in the HTTP protocol
++     * usually there is no acknowledgment step between the headers and the
++     * body (there is the 100-continue feature and the chunking facility
++     * only), so Apache has no API hook for this step.
++     *
++     * 3. the problem now occurs when the client sends a POST request for
++     * URL /foo via HTTPS the server and the server has SSL parameters
++     * re-configured on a per-URL basis for /foo. Then mod_ssl has to
++     * perform an SSL renegotiation after the request was read and before
++     * the response is sent. But the problem is the pending POST body data
++     * in the receive buffer of SSL (which Apache still has not read - it's
++     * pending until mod_cgi sucks it in). When mod_ssl now tries to perform
++     * the renegotiation the pending data leads to an I/O error.
++     *
++     * Solution Idea:
++     *
++     * There are only two solutions: Either to simply state that POST
++     * requests to URLs with SSL re-configurations are not allowed, or to
++     * renegotiate really after the _complete_ request (i.e. including
++     * the POST body) was read. Obviously the latter would be preferred,
++     * but it cannot be done easily inside Apache, because as already
++     * mentioned, there is no API step between the body reading and the body
++     * processing. And even when we mod_ssl would hook directly into the
++     * loop of mod_cgi, we wouldn't solve the problem for other handlers, of
++     * course. So the only general solution is to suck in the pending data
++     * of the request body from the OpenSSL BIO into the Apache BUFF. Then
++     * the renegotiation can be done and after this step Apache can proceed
++     * processing the request as before.
++     *
++     * Solution Implementation:
++     *
++     * We cannot simply suck in the data via an SSL_read-based loop because of
++     * HTTP chunking. Instead we _have_ to use the Apache API for this step which
++     * is aware of HTTP chunking. So the trick is to suck in the pending request
++     * data via the Apache API (which uses Apache's BUFF code and in the
++     * background mod_ssl's I/O glue code) and re-inject it later into the Apache
++     * BUFF code again. This way the data flows twice through the Apache BUFF, of
++     * course. But this way the solution doesn't depend on any Apache specifics
++     * and is fully transparent to Apache modules.
++     *
++     * !! BUT ALL THIS IS STILL NOT RE-IMPLEMENTED FOR APACHE 2.0 !!
++     */
++    if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick && (r->method_number == M_POST)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                     "SSL Re-negotiation in conjunction "
++                     "with POST method not supported!\n"
++                     "hint: try SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate");
++
++        return HTTP_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * now do the renegotiation if anything was actually reconfigured
++     */
++    if (renegotiate) {
++        /*
++         * Now we force the SSL renegotation by sending the Hello Request
++         * message to the client. Here we have to do a workaround: Actually
++         * OpenSSL returns immediately after sending the Hello Request (the
++         * intent AFAIK is because the SSL/TLS protocol says it's not a must
++         * that the client replies to a Hello Request). But because we insist
++         * on a reply (anything else is an error for us) we have to go to the
++         * ACCEPT state manually. Using SSL_set_accept_state() doesn't work
++         * here because it resets too much of the connection.  So we set the
++         * state explicitly and continue the handshake manually.
++         */
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                     "Requesting connection re-negotiation");
++
++        if (renegotiate_quick) {
++            STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack;
++
++            /* perform just a manual re-verification of the peer */
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Performing quick renegotiation: "
++                         "just re-verifying the peer");
++
++            cert_stack = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl);
++
++            cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
++
++            if (!cert_stack && cert) {
++                /* client cert is in the session cache, but there is
++                 * no chain, since ssl3_get_client_certificate()
++                 * sk_X509_shift-ed the peer cert out of the chain.
++                 * we put it back here for the purpose of quick_renegotiation.
++                 */
++                cert_stack = sk_new_null();
++                sk_X509_push(cert_stack, MODSSL_PCHAR_CAST cert);
++            }
++
++            if (!cert_stack || (sk_X509_num(cert_stack) == 0)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Cannot find peer certificate chain");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (!(cert_store ||
++                  (cert_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx))))
++            {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Cannot find certificate storage");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (!cert) {
++                cert = sk_X509_value(cert_stack, 0);
++            }
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_store_ctx, cert_store, cert, cert_stack);
++            depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(ssl);
++
++            if (depth >= 0) {
++                X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&cert_store_ctx, depth);
++            }
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&cert_store_ctx,
++                                       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),
++                                       (char *)ssl);
++
++            if (!modssl_X509_verify_cert(&cert_store_ctx)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation verification step failed");
++                ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
++            }
++
++            SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, cert_store_ctx.error);
++            X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_store_ctx);
++
++            if (cert_stack != SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl)) {
++                /* we created this ourselves, so free it */
++                sk_X509_pop_free(cert_stack, X509_free);
++            }
++        }
++        else {
++            request_rec *id = r->main ? r->main : r;
++
++            /* do a full renegotiation */
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r->server,
++                         "Performing full renegotiation: "
++                         "complete handshake protocol");
++
++            SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl,
++                                       (unsigned char *)&id,
++                                       sizeof(id));
++
++            SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
++            SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
++
++            if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation request failed");
++
++                r->connection->aborted = 1;
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Awaiting re-negotiation handshake");
++
++            SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL_ST_ACCEPT);
++            SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
++
++            if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                        "Not accepted by client!?");
++
++                r->connection->aborted = 1;
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Remember the peer certificate's DN
++         */
++        if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))) {
++            if (sslconn->client_cert) {
++                X509_free(sslconn->client_cert);
++            }
++            sslconn->client_cert = cert;
++            sslconn->client_dn = NULL;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results
++         */
++        if (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) {
++            BOOL do_verify = (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE);
++
++            if (do_verify && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK)) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                             "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                             "Client verification failed");
++
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++
++            if (do_verify) {
++                if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) == NULL) {
++                    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server,
++                                 "Re-negotiation handshake failed: "
++                                 "Client certificate missing");
++
++                    return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++                }
++
++                X509_free(peercert);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check SSLRequire boolean expressions
++     */
++    requires = dc->aRequirement;
++    ssl_requires = (ssl_require_t *)requires->elts;
++
++    for (i = 0; i < requires->nelts; i++) {
++        ssl_require_t *req = &ssl_requires[i];
++        ok = ssl_expr_exec(r, req->mpExpr);
++
++        if (ok < 0) {
++            cp = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
++                              "Failed to execute "
++                              "SSL requirement expression: %s",
++                              ssl_expr_get_error());
++
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                          "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                          r->filename, cp);
++
++            /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++            apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++
++        if (ok != 1) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Access to %s denied for %s "
++                         "(requirement expression not fulfilled)",
++                         r->filename, r->connection->remote_ip);
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                         "Failed expression: %s", req->cpExpr);
++
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, 
++                          "access to %s failed, reason: %s",
++                          r->filename,
++                          "SSL requirement expression not fulfilled "
++                          "(see SSL logfile for more details)");
++
++            /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */
++            apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1");
++
++            return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Else access is granted from our point of view (except vendor
++     * handlers override). But we have to return DECLINED here instead
++     * of OK, because mod_auth and other modules still might want to
++     * deny access.
++     */
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  Authentication Handler:
++ *  Fake a Basic authentication from the X509 client certificate.
++ *
++ *  This must be run fairly early on to prevent a real authentication from
++ *  occuring, in particular it must be run before anything else that
++ *  authenticates a user.  This means that the Module statement for this
++ *  module should be LAST in the Configuration file.
++ */
++int ssl_hook_UserCheck(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    char buf1[MAX_STRING_LEN], buf2[MAX_STRING_LEN];
++    char *clientdn;
++    const char *auth_line, *username, *password;
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally forbid access (again)
++     * when strict require option is used.
++     */
++    if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) &&
++        (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden")))
++    {
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * We decline when we are in a subrequest.  The Authorization header
++     * would already be present if it was added in the main request.
++     */
++    if (!ap_is_initial_req(r)) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Make sure the user is not able to fake the client certificate
++     * based authentication by just entering an X.509 Subject DN
++     * ("/XX=YYY/XX=YYY/..") as the username and "password" as the
++     * password.
++     */
++    if ((auth_line = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Authorization"))) {
++        if (strcEQ(ap_getword(r->pool, &auth_line, ' '), "Basic")) {
++            while ((*auth_line == ' ') || (*auth_line == '\t')) {
++                auth_line++;
++            }
++
++            auth_line = ap_pbase64decode(r->pool, auth_line);
++            username = ap_getword_nulls(r->pool, &auth_line, ':');
++            password = auth_line;
++
++            if ((username[0] == '/') && strEQ(password, "password")) {
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
++                    "Encountered FakeBasicAuth spoof: %s", username);
++                return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * We decline operation in various situations...
++     * - SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth not configured
++     * - r->user already authenticated
++     * - ssl not enabled
++     * - client did not present a certificate
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled && sslconn->ssl && sslconn->client_cert) ||
++        !(dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) || r->user)
++    {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++    
++    if (!sslconn->client_dn) {
++        X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(sslconn->client_cert);
++        char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0);
++        sslconn->client_dn = apr_pstrdup(r->connection->pool, cp);
++        modssl_free(cp);
++    }
++
++    clientdn = (char *)sslconn->client_dn;
++
++    /*
++     * Fake a password - which one would be immaterial, as, it seems, an empty
++     * password in the users file would match ALL incoming passwords, if only
++     * we were using the standard crypt library routine. Unfortunately, OpenSSL
++     * "fixes" a "bug" in crypt and thus prevents blank passwords from
++     * working.  (IMHO what they really fix is a bug in the users of the code
++     * - failing to program correctly for shadow passwords).  We need,
++     * therefore, to provide a password. This password can be matched by
++     * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file.
++     * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-)
++     */
++    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "%s:password", clientdn);
++    ssl_util_uuencode(buf2, buf1, FALSE);
++
++    apr_snprintf(buf1, sizeof(buf1), "Basic %s", buf2);
++    apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", buf1);
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server,
++                 "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", buf1);
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/* authorization phase */
++int ssl_hook_Auth(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally forbid access (again)
++     * when strict require option is used.
++     */
++    if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) &&
++        (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden")))
++    {
++        return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*
++ *   Fixup Handler
++ */
++
++static const char *ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[] = {
++    "SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE",
++    "SSL_VERSION_LIBRARY",
++    "SSL_PROTOCOL",
++    "SSL_CIPHER",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE",
++    "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_M_VERSION",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_M_SERIAL",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_V_START",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_V_END",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_C",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_L",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_T",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_I",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_G",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_S",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_D",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_C",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_L",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_O",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_T",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_I",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_G",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_S",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_D",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_A_KEY",
++    "SSL_CLIENT_A_SIG",
++    "SSL_SERVER_M_VERSION",
++    "SSL_SERVER_M_SERIAL",
++    "SSL_SERVER_V_START",
++    "SSL_SERVER_V_END",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_C",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_L",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_O",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_T",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_I",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_G",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_S",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_D",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_SERVER_S_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_C",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_ST",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_L",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_O",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_OU",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_CN",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_T",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_I",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_G",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_S",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_D",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_UID",
++    "SSL_SERVER_I_DN_Email",
++    "SSL_SERVER_A_KEY",
++    "SSL_SERVER_A_SIG",
++    "SSL_SESSION_ID",
++    NULL
++};
++
++int ssl_hook_Fixup(request_rec *r)
++{
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r);
++    apr_table_t *env = r->subprocess_env;
++    char *var, *val = "";
++    STACK_OF(X509) *peer_certs;
++    SSL *ssl;
++    int i;
++
++    /*
++     * Check to see if SSL is on
++     */
++    if (!(sc->enabled && sslconn && (ssl = sslconn->ssl))) {
++        return DECLINED;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Annotate the SSI/CGI environment with standard SSL information
++     */
++    /* the always present HTTPS (=HTTP over SSL) flag! */
++    apr_table_setn(env, "HTTPS", "on"); 
++
++    /* standard SSL environment variables */
++    if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STDENVVARS) {
++        for (i = 0; ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; i++) {
++            var = (char *)ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i];
++            val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, r, var);
++            if (!strIsEmpty(val)) {
++                apr_table_setn(env, var, val);
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * On-demand bloat up the SSI/CGI environment with certificate data
++     */
++    if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_EXPORTCERTDATA) {
++        val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                             r, "SSL_SERVER_CERT");
++
++        apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_SERVER_CERT", val);
++
++        val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                             r, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT");
++
++        apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT", val);
++
++        if ((peer_certs = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) {
++            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(peer_certs); i++) {
++                var = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT_CHAIN_%d", i);
++                val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection,
++                                     r, var);
++                if (val) {
++                    apr_table_setn(env, var, val);
++                }
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    return DECLINED;
++}
++
++/*  _________________________________________________________________
++**
++**  OpenSSL Callback Functions
++**  _________________________________________________________________
++*/
++
++/*
++ * Handle out temporary RSA private keys on demand
++ *
++ * The background of this as the TLSv1 standard explains it:
++ *
++ * | D.1. Temporary RSA keys
++ * |
++ * |    US Export restrictions limit RSA keys used for encryption to 512
++ * |    bits, but do not place any limit on lengths of RSA keys used for
++ * |    signing operations. Certificates often need to be larger than 512
++ * |    bits, since 512-bit RSA keys are not secure enough for high-value
++ * |    transactions or for applications requiring long-term security. Some
++ * |    certificates are also designated signing-only, in which case they
++ * |    cannot be used for key exchange.
++ * |
++ * |    When the public key in the certificate cannot be used for encryption,
++ * |    the server signs a temporary RSA key, which is then exchanged. In
++ * |    exportable applications, the temporary RSA key should be the maximum
++ * |    allowable length (i.e., 512 bits). Because 512-bit RSA keys are
++ * |    relatively insecure, they should be changed often. For typical
++ * |    electronic commerce applications, it is suggested that keys be
++ * |    changed daily or every 500 transactions, and more often if possible.
++ * |    Note that while it is acceptable to use the same temporary key for
++ * |    multiple transactions, it must be signed each time it is used.
++ * |
++ * |    RSA key generation is a time-consuming process. In many cases, a
++ * |    low-priority process can be assigned the task of key generation.
++ * |    Whenever a new key is completed, the existing temporary key can be
++ * |    replaced with the new one.
++ *
++ * XXX: base on comment above, if thread support is enabled,
++ * we should spawn a low-priority thread to generate new keys
++ * on the fly.
++ *
++ * So we generated 512 and 1024 bit temporary keys on startup
++ * which we now just hand out on demand....
++ */
++
++RSA *ssl_callback_TmpRSA(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
++    int idx;
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c->base_server,
++                 "handing out temporary %d bit RSA key", keylen);
++
++    /* doesn't matter if export flag is on,
++     * we won't be asked for keylen > 512 in that case.
++     * if we are asked for a keylen > 1024, it is too expensive
++     * to generate on the fly.
++     * XXX: any reason not to generate 2048 bit keys at startup?
++     */
++
++    switch (keylen) {
++      case 512:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_512;
++        break;
++
++      case 1024:
++      default:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_1024;
++    }
++
++    return (RSA *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx];
++}
++
++/* 
++ * Hand out the already generated DH parameters...
++ */
++DH *ssl_callback_TmpDH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfig(c->base_server);
++    int idx;
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c->base_server,
++                 "handing out temporary %d bit DH key", keylen);
++
++    switch (keylen) {
++      case 512:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_512;
++        break;
++
++      case 1024:
++      default:
++        idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024;
++    }
++
++    return (DH *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx];
++}
++
++/*
++ * This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL
++ * does client authentication and verifies the certificate chain.
++ */
++int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    SSL *ssl            = (SSL *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data(ctx);
++    conn_rec *conn      = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s       = conn->base_server;
++    request_rec *r      = (request_rec *)SSL_get_app_data2(ssl);
++
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    SSLDirConfigRec *dc = r ? myDirConfig(r) : NULL;
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(conn);
++    modssl_ctx_t *mctx  = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
++
++    /* Get verify ingredients */
++    int errnum   = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
++    int errdepth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
++    int depth, verify;
++
++    /*
++     * Log verification information
++     */
++    if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        X509 *cert  = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
++        char *sname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0);
++        char *iname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert),  NULL, 0);
++
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: "
++                     "depth: %d, subject: %s, issuer: %s",
++                     errdepth,
++                     sname ? sname : "-unknown-",
++                     iname ? iname : "-unknown-");
++
++        if (sname) {
++            modssl_free(sname);
++        }
++
++        if (iname) {
++            modssl_free(iname);
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Check for optionally acceptable non-verifiable issuer situation
++     */
++    if (dc && (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) {
++        verify = dc->nVerifyClient;
++    }
++    else {
++        verify = mctx->auth.verify_mode;
++    }
++
++    if (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) {
++        /* 
++         * SSLProxyVerify is either not configured or set to "none".
++         * (this callback doesn't happen in the server context if SSLVerify
++         *  is not configured or set to "none")
++         */
++        return TRUE;
++    }
++
++    if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(errnum) &&
++        (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA))
++    {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Verifiable Issuer is "
++                     "configured as optional, therefore we're accepting "
++                     "the certificate");
++
++        sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS";
++        ok = TRUE;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Additionally perform CRL-based revocation checks
++     */
++    if (ok) {
++        if (!(ok = ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(ok, ctx, conn))) {
++            errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason
++     */
++    if (!ok) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s",
++                     errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum));
++
++        if (sslconn->client_cert) {
++            X509_free(sslconn->client_cert);
++            sslconn->client_cert = NULL;
++        }
++        sslconn->client_dn = NULL;
++        sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Finally check the depth of the certificate verification
++     */
++    if (dc && (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET)) {
++        depth = dc->nVerifyDepth;
++    }
++    else {
++        depth = mctx->auth.verify_depth;
++    }
++
++    if (errdepth > depth) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, s,
++                     "Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long "
++                     "(chain has %d certificates, but maximum allowed are "
++                     "only %d)",
++                     errdepth, depth);
++
++        errnum = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
++        sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum);
++
++        ok = FALSE;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * And finally signal OpenSSL the (perhaps changed) state
++     */
++    return ok;
++}
++
++int ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, conn_rec *c)
++{
++    server_rec *s       = c->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c);
++    modssl_ctx_t *mctx  = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
++    X509_OBJECT obj;
++    X509_NAME *subject, *issuer;
++    X509 *cert;
++    X509_CRL *crl;
++    EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
++    int i, n, rc;
++
++    /*
++     * Unless a revocation store for CRLs was created we
++     * cannot do any CRL-based verification, of course.
++     */
++    if (!mctx->crl) {
++        return ok;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Determine certificate ingredients in advance
++     */
++    cert    = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
++    subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
++    issuer  = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
++
++    /*
++     * OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does not
++     * use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it
++     * explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked
++     * certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store.
++     *
++     * We come through this procedure for each certificate in the certificate
++     * chain, starting with the root-CA's certificate. At each step we've to
++     * both verify the signature on the CRL (to make sure it's a valid CRL)
++     * and it's revocation list (to make sure the current certificate isn't
++     * revoked).  But because to check the signature on the CRL we need the
++     * public key of the issuing CA certificate (which was already processed
++     * one round before), we've a little problem. But we can both solve it and
++     * at the same time optimize the processing by using the following
++     * verification scheme (idea and code snippets borrowed from the GLOBUS
++     * project):
++     *
++     * 1. We'll check the signature of a CRL in each step when we find a CRL
++     *    through the _subject_ name of the current certificate. This CRL
++     *    itself will be needed the first time in the next round, of course.
++     *    But we do the signature processing one round before this where the
++     *    public key of the CA is available.
++     *
++     * 2. We'll check the revocation list of a CRL in each step when
++     *    we find a CRL through the _issuer_ name of the current certificate.
++     *    This CRLs signature was then already verified one round before.
++     *
++     * This verification scheme allows a CA to revoke its own certificate as
++     * well, of course.
++     */
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of
++     * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity.
++     */
++    memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
++    rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl,
++                               X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj);
++    crl = obj.data.crl;
++
++    if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
++        /*
++         * Log information about CRL
++         * (A little bit complicated because of ASN.1 and BIOs...)
++         */
++        if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++            char buff[512]; /* should be plenty */
++            BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, "CA CRL: Issuer: ");
++            X509_NAME_print(bio, issuer, 0);
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, ", lastUpdate: ");
++            ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl));
++
++            BIO_printf(bio, ", nextUpdate: ");
++            ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
++
++            n = BIO_read(bio, buff, sizeof(buff));
++            buff[n] = '\0';
++
++            BIO_free(bio);
++
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, buff);
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Verify the signature on this CRL
++         */
++        pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
++        rc = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pubkey);
++#ifdef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
++        /* Only refcounted in OpenSSL */
++        if (pubkey)
++            EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
++#endif
++        if (rc <= 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Invalid signature on CRL");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        /*
++         * Check date of CRL to make sure it's not expired
++         */
++        i = X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
++
++        if (i == 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,
++                                     X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        if (i < 0) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                         "Found CRL is expired - "
++                         "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL");
++
++            X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED);
++            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++            return FALSE;
++        }
++
++        X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of
++     * the current certificate in order to check for revocation.
++     */
++    memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
++    rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl,
++                               X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj);
++
++    crl = obj.data.crl;
++    if ((rc > 0) && crl) {
++        /*
++         * Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL
++         */
++        n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl));
++
++        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
++            X509_REVOKED *revoked =
++                sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i);
++
++            ASN1_INTEGER *sn = X509_REVOKED_get_serialNumber(revoked);
++
++            if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) {
++                if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++                    char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0);
++                    long serial = ASN1_INTEGER_get(sn);
++
++                    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s,
++                                 "Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) "
++                                 "revoked per CRL from issuer %s",
++                                 serial, serial, cp);
++                    modssl_free(cp);
++                }
++
++                X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
++                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++
++                return FALSE;
++            }
++        }
++
++        X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
++    }
++
++    return ok;
++}
++
++#define SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT \
++   "Proxy client certificate callback: (%s) "
++
++static void modssl_proxy_info_log(server_rec *s,
++                                  X509_INFO *info,
++                                  const char *msg)
++{
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    char name_buf[256];
++    X509_NAME *name;
++    char *dn;
++
++    if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    name = X509_get_subject_name(info->x509);
++    dn = X509_NAME_oneline(name, name_buf, sizeof(name_buf));
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "%s, sending %s", 
++                 sc->vhost_id, msg, dn ? dn : "-uknown-");
++}
++
++/*
++ * caller will decrement the cert and key reference
++ * so we need to increment here to prevent them from
++ * being freed.
++ */
++#define modssl_set_cert_info(info, cert, pkey) \
++    *cert = info->x509; \
++    X509_reference_inc(*cert); \
++    *pkey = info->x_pkey->dec_pkey; \
++    EVP_PKEY_reference_inc(*pkey)
++
++int ssl_callback_proxy_cert(SSL *ssl, MODSSL_CLIENT_CERT_CB_ARG_TYPE **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey) 
++{
++    conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s = c->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    X509_NAME *ca_name, *issuer;
++    X509_INFO *info;
++    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list;
++    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *certs = sc->proxy->pkp->certs;
++    int i, j;
++    
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, 
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "entered",
++                 sc->vhost_id);
++
++    if (!certs || (sk_X509_INFO_num(certs) <= 0)) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s,
++                     SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT
++                     "downstream server wanted client certificate "
++                     "but none are configured", sc->vhost_id);
++        return FALSE;
++    }                                                                     
++
++    ca_list = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
++
++    if (!ca_list || (sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list) <= 0)) {
++        /* 
++         * downstream server didn't send us a list of acceptable CA certs, 
++         * so we send the first client cert in the list.
++         */   
++        info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, 0);
++        
++        modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "no acceptable CA list");
++
++        modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey);
++
++        return TRUE;
++    }         
++
++    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list); i++) {
++        ca_name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_list, i);
++
++        for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_INFO_num(certs); j++) {
++            info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, j);
++            issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(info->x509);
++
++            if (X509_NAME_cmp(issuer, ca_name) == 0) {
++                modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "found acceptable cert");
++
++                modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey);
++
++                return TRUE;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT
++                 "no client certificate found!?", sc->vhost_id);
++
++    return FALSE; 
++}
++
++static void ssl_session_log(server_rec *s,
++                            const char *request,
++                            unsigned char *id,
++                            unsigned int idlen,
++                            const char *status,
++                            const char *result,
++                            long timeout)
++{
++    char buf[SSL_SESSION_ID_STRING_LEN];
++    char timeout_str[56] = {'\0'};
++
++    if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    if (timeout) {
++        apr_snprintf(timeout_str, sizeof(timeout_str),
++                     "timeout=%lds ", (timeout - time(NULL)));
++    }
++
++    ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                 "Inter-Process Session Cache: "
++                 "request=%s status=%s id=%s %s(session %s)",
++                 request, status,
++                 SSL_SESSION_id2sz(id, idlen, buf, sizeof(buf)),
++                 timeout_str, result);
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a new SSL_SESSION is
++ *  added to the internal OpenSSL session cache. We use this hook to spread the
++ *  SSL_SESSION also to the inter-process disk-cache to make share it with our
++ *  other Apache pre-forked server processes.
++ */
++int ssl_callback_NewSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    conn_rec *conn      = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s       = conn->base_server;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++    long timeout        = sc->session_cache_timeout;
++    BOOL rc;
++    unsigned char *id;
++    unsigned int idlen;
++
++    /*
++     * Set the timeout also for the internal OpenSSL cache, because this way
++     * our inter-process cache is consulted only when it's really necessary.
++     */
++    SSL_set_timeout(session, timeout);
++
++    /*
++     * Store the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process cache with the
++     * same expire time, so it expires automatically there, too.
++     */
++    id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session);
++    idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session);
++
++    timeout += modssl_session_get_time(session);
++
++    rc = ssl_scache_store(s, id, idlen, timeout, session);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "SET", id, idlen,
++                    rc == TRUE ? "OK" : "BAD",
++                    "caching", timeout);
++
++    /*
++     * return 0 which means to OpenSSL that the session is still
++     * valid and was not freed by us with SSL_SESSION_free().
++     */
++    return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a
++ *  SSL_SESSION is looked up in the internal OpenSSL cache and it
++ *  was not found. We use this to lookup the SSL_SESSION in the
++ *  inter-process disk-cache where it was perhaps stored by one
++ *  of our other Apache pre-forked server processes.
++ */
++SSL_SESSION *ssl_callback_GetSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl,
++                                               unsigned char *id,
++                                               int idlen, int *do_copy)
++{
++    /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */
++    conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
++    server_rec *s  = conn->base_server;
++    SSL_SESSION *session;
++
++    /*
++     * Try to retrieve the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
++     */
++    session = ssl_scache_retrieve(s, id, idlen);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "GET", id, idlen,
++                    session ? "FOUND" : "MISSED",
++                    session ? "reuse" : "renewal", 0);
++
++    /*
++     * Return NULL or the retrieved SSL_SESSION. But indicate (by
++     * setting do_copy to 0) that the reference count on the
++     * SSL_SESSION should not be incremented by the SSL library,
++     * because we will no longer hold a reference to it ourself.
++     */
++    *do_copy = 0;
++
++    return session;
++}
++
++/*
++ *  This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a
++ *  SSL_SESSION is removed from the the internal OpenSSL cache.
++ *  We use this to remove the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process
++ *  disk-cache, too.
++ */
++void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx,
++                                       SSL_SESSION *session)
++{
++    server_rec *s;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
++    unsigned char *id;
++    unsigned int idlen;
++
++    /*
++     * Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context
++     */
++    if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) {
++        return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */
++    }
++
++    sc = mySrvConfig(s);
++
++    /*
++     * Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
++     */
++    id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session);
++    idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session);
++
++    ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen);
++
++    ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen,
++                    "OK", "dead", 0);
++
++    return;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This callback function is executed while OpenSSL processes the
++ * SSL handshake and does SSL record layer stuff. We use it to
++ * trace OpenSSL's processing in out SSL logfile.
++ */
++void ssl_callback_LogTracingState(MODSSL_INFO_CB_ARG_TYPE ssl, int where, int rc)
++{
++    conn_rec *c;
++    server_rec *s;
++    SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
++
++    /*
++     * find corresponding server
++     */
++    if (!(c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data((SSL *)ssl))) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    s = c->base_server;
++    if (!(sc = mySrvConfig(s))) {
++        return;
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * create the various trace messages
++     */
++    if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) {
++        if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Handshake: start", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Handshake: done", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME);
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Loop: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_READ) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Read: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Write: %s",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
++            char *str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
++            ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                         "%s: Alert: %s:%s:%s\n",
++                         SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, str,
++                         SSL_alert_type_string_long(rc),
++                         SSL_alert_desc_string_long(rc));
++        }
++        else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
++            if (rc == 0) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                             "%s: Exit: failed in %s",
++                             SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++            }
++            else if (rc < 0) {
++                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s,
++                             "%s: Exit: error in %s",
++                             SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
++            }
++        }
++    }
++
++    /*
++     * Because SSL renegotations can happen at any time (not only after
++     * SSL_accept()), the best way to log the current connection details is
++     * right after a finished handshake.
++     */
++    if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) {
++        ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s,
++                     "Connection: Client IP: %s, Protocol: %s, "
++                     "Cipher: %s (%s/%s bits)",
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "REMOTE_ADDR"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_PROTOCOL"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE"),
++                     ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE"));
++    }
++}
++